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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions:
* What organizational features (i.e. types of leadership, structure, etc.) are significant in
executing successful urban redevelopment projects?
* To what extent does organizational capacity make certain projects successful?
Primary research question:
What aspects of organizational capacity contribute to the positive or negative outcomes of
urban redevelopment projects and in what way?
Organizational capacity is defined as how well an agency organizes its human, social, financial,
and technical resources.
These questions are answered through an in-depth case study of the Community
Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles (CRA) with respect to its redevelopment of the
Crenshaw Center, a regional shopping center built in the late 1940s, into the Baldwin Hills
Crenshaw Plaza, a mail completed in 1988. The mall is once again the target of new, extensive
redevelpment plans. Research was conducted through theoretical and archival research,
supplemented by interviews with those involved with the development and execution of the
project, as well site observation.
What emerges from the fieldwork and empirical research is a strategic understanding of
organizational capacity that is useful in diagnosing key features of an organization that pursues
urban redevelopment, and in suggesting areas for strengthening the organization's capacity.
The key features of organizational capacity for CRA are cultivating internal leadership,
concretely defining mission and central tasks, negotiating power-balanced relationships, and
managing their network of actors.
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Urban redevelopment projects have made an indelible mark on contemporary cityscapes. The
urban renewal projects of the last century wiped out entire neighborhoods and displaced millions
under the guise of revitalization. As evidenced by such projects, public agencies have central
roles in determining urban planning outcomes. Many of these agencies confront significant
organizational challenges, faced by many in the public sector, in undertaking large and complex
redevelopment projects intended to meet the needs of various constituencies. This is an
incredibly overwhelming task that can easily fall short of success. In spite of this, some agencies
are able to transform areas with blighted and vacant parcels to communities with diverse uses,
users, and residents, while others flounder. What makes some agencies more adept at
performing urban redevelopment projects than others?
Central Questions
A principal factor in determining the performance of urban redevelopment agencies is their level
of organizational capacity. Organizational capacity can be defined as how well an agency
organizes its human, social, financial, and technical resources. This has a great impact on an
organization's ability to function effectively. Most agencies are stronger in organizing some
areas of resources than others. Some might be particularly skilled in managing financial
resources, but much weaker in aligning staff and departments in ways that facilitate successful
performance. By evaluating these categories of resources, an agency's overall organizational
capacity can be determined. The following questions emerge from this line of thinking in relation
to urban development projects:
* What organizational features are significant in executing successful urban redevelopment
projects?
What are the elements of a successful urban redevelopment project?
These two questions lead to my primary research question:
What aspects of organizational capacity contribute to the positive or negative outcomes of
urban redevelopment projects and in what way?
This thesis will analyze public-sector organizational capacity and its effect on the outcomes of
large-scale, inner-city urban redevelopment projects. I will use the case study of the Community
Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles (CRA) with respect to its redevelopment of the
Crenshaw Center, one of the country's first regional shopping centers, into the Baldwin Hills
Crenshaw Plaza, a mall in a primarily African-American neighborhood. My analysis of the CRA as
an organization is means- and not ends-oriented; I am interested in analyzing the "outcomes of
planning actions by multiple actors" and not solely "analyzing the actions of one public sector
organization."' This will yield an analysis that not only looks at different actors in the mall's
redevelopment but also their characteristics, purpose, and location within the city's complex
power structures. Public agencies with planning functions must consider these questions: it is
important for them to be reflective and evaluative of their practices in order to continuously
improve upon them and increase their impact.
Case Study Background
Opening as a regional shopping center in 1947 to great fanfare, the Crenshaw Center was wildly
successful for decades. The center began its roller-coaster sales and vacancy rates in the
1970s when the demographics of the area started to change dramatically. The surrounding
neighborhood went from being predominantly white to African-American, a sizable percentage
of them middle- or upper-income households. Ever since, it has failed to attract its new
neighbors in large numbers. The CRA became involved in the site in the 1980s as a result of
political pressure from the Mayor, community, and City Council district office to address the
center's deteriorating conditions. The redeveloped mall, newly christened the Baldwin Hills
Crenshaw Plaza, has served as a symbol for the economic well being of the area since its
1 Aseem Inam, Planning for the Unplanned: Recovering from Crises in Megacities (New York: Routledge, 2005), 20.
Emphasis added.
opening in 1988. Its ebbs and flows reflect the changing and difficult times the area has faced.
The site is currently the target of extensive redevelopment by a new owner, Capri Capital,
looking to transform the site once again.
The CRA is tasked with redeveloping struggling areas like this within a challenging set of
conditions and interests. Growing from an agency with a single project in downtown in 1948,
the CRA now operates 32 project areas on a $725 million annual budget.2 The agency's central
aim remains similar to that at its outset, to "cultivate fertile ground for private investment" that
will provide work, decent housing, public amenities, and social services.3 Its tasks have since
grown to encompass a much wider scope than at its creation. By the 1990s the CRA worked on
projects of affordable housing, job creation and retention, economic development,
transportation, public art, open space, historic preservation, childcare, culture, and so on. This
broad scope made its work flexible in the eyes of some, but too diffuse according to others.
While its scope of work grew, its workforce and funding decreased, losing half its staff and 62
percent of its revenue from 1994 to 2004.4
In recent times, the agency has often been criticized for quickly completing redevelopment
projects for booming areas like Hollywood and downtown while those destined for faltering
stretches of East and South Los Angeles can take decades. Current Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa
appointed a new CRA board in 2005 with a specific mandate to "aggressively move important
projects forward to revitalize neighborhoods, bring back economic development, jobs, and
housing"' in order to combat the agency's historic investment disparity evident in many of the
city's lower-income and minority areas.
Methodology
In order to answer these questions, I chose to complete an in-depth case study. The research
for this case study consisted mainly of scholarly and archival research, supplemented by
interviews with those involved with the development and execution of the project. The scholarly
research helped outline the analytical framework used to evaluate the organizational functioning
2 Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles (CRA/LA), "CRA/LA Budget 2008-2009," 2008.
3 CRA/LA, Agency video (short version), 1991.
4 Rick Orlov, "Sweeping CRA Changes Made," Daily News, September 29, 2004.
5 Patrick McGreevy, "New CRA Panel Gets Mayor's Directive," Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2005.
of the CRA and provide context within organizational literature. The archival research consists
of a review of CRA documents and newspaper articles. CRA documents dating from 1984 were
reviewed to determine the formal plans and goals for the site. Newspaper articles dating from
the 1940s, mostly from the Los Angeles Times, were reviewed for information about the
creation of the CRA, the original Crenshaw Center development, the neighborhood's history, and
the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza redevelopment.
I conducted eight in-depth interviews with current and past CRA staff, political staffers, and a
newspaper reporter. Relevant CRA staff were identified through the CRA website and a video on
the redevelopment of downtown Los Angeles. From the four interviews with CRA staff, I sought
to learn more about the formal workings of the agency, its roles in redeveloping the site, its
definition of successful projects, and to get a sense of its organizational culture. Initial contacts
were then asked for further CRA or other staff that would be helpful in my research. From these
recommendations I identified three other current or former City Council staffers to interview.
The reporter was identified through her prolific coverage of the mall and the surrounding area
for the Los Angeles Times and the LA Weekly, which spans over a decade. Interviews with
political staffers and the reporter provided some perspective on working with the agency,
outside perceptions of the agency, and definitions of project success. These interviews were
open-ended but were structured by a set of questions found in the appendix.
Four site visits were made between December 2008 and March 2009. During these site visits, I
documented the site through observation and photographs, some of which are used in later
chapters. I focused on observing conditions at the mall, including overall maintenance of the
building and stores as well as types of retailers and quality of merchandise stocked. Site visits
were purposely completed on different days of the week and times to compare levels of use.
Limitations
The biggest limitation to this study is the use of one case study, versus various, which does not
allow for comparison. This is a study of one project, in one agency, in one city. A much richer
analysis could result from comparisons across projects, agencies, cities, and even countries.
However, this analysis is still useful in extracting lessons from this single case and how this
agency interpreted and responded to the challenges it faced.
Another principal limitation of this research was the small numbers of interviews conducted.
Ideally, more past and present CRA staff would have been interviewed, like the regional manager
of CRA's South Los Angeles office who was away on personal leave. I also wanted to meet with
representatives from the various owners and developers of the mail but these were difficult to
contact. In attempting to find a representative from one of the development companies
prominent in the site's recent history, the Johnson Development Corporation, I found that it had
recently dissolved. I also tried contacting members of community-based organizations like the
Crenshaw Chamber of Commerce and the Crenshaw Community Action Committee but received
no response. The added input of these individuals would have surely enriched the analysis and
maybe even yielded different results.
The analytical framework presented also exhibits limitations. The organizational literature
relevant to this analysis is far too extensive to cover here. Readers familiar with this body of
work will find other connections to previously discussed theories that could more precisely
explain the forces that I found that at work at the CRA.
In evaluating the financial success of the mall, I assumed easy access to market data from the
management company, Festival Companies. Since data on the mall's performance was
periodically reported in newspaper articles, I assumed this data was frequently shared. Inquiries
to numerous individuals at Festival were not successful. I soon learned that it is common for
companies to closely guard this kind of data in order to remain competitive. This forced me to
evaluate the mall using insufficient and sometimes contradicting data cobbled together mainly
from what had already been published in newspapers.
Summary
The second chapter will provide a definition of "organizational capacity" and provide an
analytical background on relevant theories useful in understanding the workings of public
agencies. This framework and the site's history in the third chapter will provide the foundation
for the case study analysis. Chapter 4 will redefine organizational capacity as it applies to this
case study and outline the features that had a prominent role in determining how the CRA
defined its work, its relationship to other actors, and its outcomes. Chapter 5 will present the
study's principal findings and provide recommendations on how the CRA can improve the
efficacy of its work.
The CRA has had varying levels of success in the redevelopment of the Crenshaw Center into
the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza. As this analysis will show, the agency faces challenges in the
areas of internal leadership and its development, political influence, and broad definition of its
mission and central tasks. Redevelopment is a powerful mechanism to reshape the city. In order
maximize public benefit through redevelopment, the CRA must reinvent itself as an organization
and in the eyes of other groups of actors in order to reshape its work and the city it serves.
Chapter 2
Organizational Capacity in Public Agencies
Selznick defines an organization as "a lean, no-nonsense system of coordinated activities, [...] a
rational instrument engineered to do a job."6 Anyone who has experience working with any type
of organization knows that many more elements come into play when groups of individuals join
forces to pursue a goal or common interest. Sometimes an overbearing leader dominates. Other
times outside pressures constrain and shape the direction of the organization. There are
countless examples of how organizations often veer from the their defined purpose. In my
analysis of the CRA and its involvement in the redevelopment of the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw
Plaza, I seek to identify the prominent features that impact its work and how these features
interact to produce positive or negative outcomes. This resulting interaction and its effect on
the performance of the agency is deeply tied to what I am terming "organizational capacity." In
addition to defining organizational capacity in this chapter, I will also discuss elements and
theories that are relevant in understanding the workings of public agencies as they relate to my
analysis.
Defining Organizational Capacity
In their study of twenty-four restructuring schools, Newman, et al. tie organizational capacity
with accountability and performance. They define organizational capacity as the "efforts to
organize the human, technical, and social resources of [an organization] into an effective
collective enterprise."7 Another useful definition of the term comes from Fredericksen and
6 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1957), 5.
7 Fred Newman et al., "Accountability and school performance: Implications from restructuring schools," Harvard
Educational Review 67 (1997): 41.
London. They believe that internal organizational capacity is derived from various elements of
an organization and provides the "basis upon which organizations can implement programs and
achieve goals." They propose four elements of organizational capacity to be used as a
framework for examining the capacity of organizations: leadership and vision, management and
planning, fiscal planning and practice, and operational support. Although Newman's work is
focused on schools and Fredericksen's on community development corporations, a combination
of these definitions provides an excellent definition for this analysis.
With the addition of financial resources to Newman's definition, the two definitions align very
well. In constructing the definition of organizational capacity for this case study, Newman's
definition provides the outline and Fredericksen's the proper foci for analysis.
Organizational capacity - the ability to organize the human, technical, financial, and
social resources of an organization into an effective collective enterprise with
regards to the following features:
Human - Leadership and Vision
Social - Management and Planning
Technical -4 Operational Support
Financial -k Fiscal Planning and Practice
This definition constructs a useful framework in which to begin my discussion of organizational
capacity of public agencies.
My discussion of organizational capacity with regards to the CRA will focus on developing three
of these elements; I will not be discussing the operational/technical element since it was
surprisingly not mentioned in any of the interviews I conducted. Social, human, and financial
resources played prominent roles. The following sections will provide a theoretical framework in
which my analysis of each type of resource and the conduct of actors within a specific political-
economic context is based. In reading these sections, the reader should also keep in mind
Leonard's public sector strategy-building framework, which outlines capacity, support, and
public value as the three crucial characteristics in successful public interventions, 9 which also
heavily contributed to the analytical framework being used (see Table 2.1).
8 Patricia Fredericksen and Rosanne London, "Disconnect in the Hollow State: The Pivotal Role of Organizational Capacity
in Community-Based Developmental Organizations," Public Administration Review 60 (2000): 233.
9 Herman B. Leonard, "A Short Note on Public Sector Strategy-Building," (2002).
Organizational Capacity
Elements Features
Human Leadership and Vision
Leadership v. Management
Mission and Central Tasks
Social Management and Planning
Hierarchical v. Network Structure
Relationships with other Actors
Financial Fiscal Planning and Practice
Constraints
Efficiency
Organizational Capacity + Support + Public Value =
Successful Public Interventions
Table 2.1 Analytical Framework 10
Human - Leadership and Vision
In the formal hierarchy of actors in organizations, it is often the most powerful that get to
decide the "collective purpose." They are the gatekeepers of information, which is packaged
and presented to serve certain needs. It is not surprising then that for many organizational
theorists leadership is central to the success of an organization. Often times the quality of
leader is even more crucial than having a strong vision, mainly because leaders have the power
to reformulate and restructure as they see fit. Organizations are often passed down to new
leaders with inadequate vision or mission statements. A strong leader will recognize this
inadequacy and reformulate the organization's vision in order to chart a new course. Wilson
believes that skilled leaders are able to come into an environment and "correctly identify the
critical tasks of that organization, distribute authority in a way appropriate to those tasks,
infuse their subordinates with a sense of mission, and acquire sufficient autonomy," allowing
them to successfully complete the job at hand." Ostroff classifies leaders as those who are able
to "court support among key stakeholders, rededicate employees to an agency's true mission,
undertake reform so comprehensively that resistant elements are unable to subvert it, and lay
the groundwork for next steps so clearly and systematically that progress continues when
10 Author.
" James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989),
365.
leadership changes hands."12 Both of these descriptions of what leaders should be are extremely
tall orders. Many of the examples of bureaucratic change and reform Wilson gives in his book
have strident leaders at their core.
If leaders are so central to organizational success, why then are government agencies not
devoting more effort to recruiting and maintaining a cadre of strong leaders? One of the first
set of obstacles are personnel rules and regulations; many government agencies' ability to hire
and fire based on merit is prohibited or strictly limited. This is one of the many constraints
which public agencies face in their quest for successful results. Another obstacle is the public
sector tendency towards placing those with good managerial skills in positions of leadership. As
Kotter makes clear, managerial and leadership skills are distinct but equally valuable.13 Whereas
managers tend to plan, staff, control, and problem solve, leaders set directions, align, motivate,
and inspire. Kotter would argue that the director of a public agency should be in charge of
creating the vision and direction of the agency, not with determining the daily operations of
each employee, which should be the charge of lower level managers. It is important to note that
these skills are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some agencies actively practice cultivating
leader-managers to fill their top ranks, though Kotter would not approve.
In addition to strong leaders, organizations need visions that provide strong direction. Many
organizations approach this need by crafting formal mission or vision statements, sometimes
both. It might first be useful to differentiate between the two. A vision "says something that
helps clarify the direction in which an organization needs to move." 14 This statement or idea
needs to convey a picture of the future that is easy to communicate and appeals to
stakeholders both internally and externally. An organizational mission is one that sets
parameters for an organization's work, motivates and inspires, and also helps evaluate
performance. 5I A mission statement should include the organization's purpose, its values, and
the kind of work it does. It should be clear and "translatable into concrete actions." What may
seem relatively simple is of extreme importance. If the leaders of an organization are unable to
12 Frank Ostroff, "Change Management in Government," Harvard Business Review, 84 (2006): 2.
13 John P. Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do," Harvard Business Review 79 (2001): 86.
14 John P. Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail," Harvard Business Review 73 (1995): 63.
s Peter Zimmerman, "Articulating Mission/Leading Change," September 25, 2008.
clearly articulate or get stakeholders to buy into their defined vision or mission, their work
cannot be successful.
Leaders and visions are critical in determining the culture of an organization. Cultures are
"patterned way[s] of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an
organization." 16 Another, more detailed, definition of culture is:
a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. 17
Cultures often appear in the forms of accepted values, behavior, and process norms that are
institutionalized in an organization over time. Cultures are passed through generations and are
resistant to change. The process of institutionalization reflects the organization's history, its
employees, the groups it represents, the values they jointly create, and how it has adapted to
its environment.' 8 An organization's functions move beyond the technical, incorporating
psychological and social functions. There is also a connection between culture and
organizational goals. The level of precision with which goals and tasks are defined is inversely
related with the opportunity for a culture to fill in the gaps in determining how an organization
functions.
Social - Management and Planning
The management of public organizations poses many challenges. One of the challenges
currently at the forefront of public management is how to rethink traditional organizational
theory and structures when government has entered an era of "third-party government."' '
Instead of undertaking tasks on their own, government agencies more frequently contract out
traditionally publicly-provided services, everything from social and health services to garbage
collection. These "third parties" take on a quasi-governmental role by delivering "publicly
financed services and pursu[ing] publicly authorized purposes." This creates an intricate
network of actors that share public authority and responsibility. Although most organizations
still agonize over careful ordering of organizational charts to reflect their formal, hierarchical
16 Wilson, 91.
17 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 17.
18 Selznick, 1 6.
19 Lester M. Salamon, The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 2.
structures, they regularly conduct work through a much more complex set of organizational
networks. 20 The government gains allies but also loses a degree of control over its operations in
this new structure characterized by "interdependencies between public agencies" and other
third-party actors. The proliferation of contracting destroys the traditional image of monolithic
governments by bringing a wide variety of actors into the "public" sector.
Another iteration of private-sector involvement in the public sphere is that of formal public-
private partnerships, where two or more entities undertake a program or project jointly.
Weiss cites "problem solving" as being one of the drivers of cooperation.2 1 When an agency is
faced with a task in which they lack expertise, they can look to other organizations that have
more experience in the area. While Weiss advocates for intra-organization cooperation, she
notes "cooperation is easier to advocate than to practice." Cooperation is often driven by the
values of staff; if staff personally believe that cooperation is valuable, an agency is more likely
to engage and be successful in cooperative efforts. Coalition-building within these partnerships
is also imperative. Simply declaring a partnership or even the existence of a memorandum of
understanding does not guarantee true cooperation. Parties must develop a shared assessment
of "problems and opportunities, and create a minimum level of trust and communication"22 to
move forward towards unified goals.
This diffusion of service provision increases the number of entities working to address the
comprehensive array of public needs but it also presents numerous challenges. Salomon lists
these as:
Pluriformity -involvement of a diverse range of organizational types with limited
cooperative experience and knowledge of each others' operating styles
Self-referentiality- actors with individual interests, frames of reference, and sets
of incentives
Asymmetric interdependencies - actors with different timelines, needs, and levels
of urgency; one actor always needs another actor more
Dynamism - facets of the relationship change over time23
20 Salomon, 11.
21 Janet A. Weiss, "Pathways to Cooperation among Public Agencies," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7
(1987): 98.
22 Kotter, (1995), 62.
23 Salomon, 1 3.
Another challenge is a potential loss of legitimacy due to projects with unsuccessful processes
or outcomes. Organizations are able to sustain their legitimacy if they serve "collectively valued
purposes over time." 24 They need to communicate to constituents that they are undertaking
legitimate projects and plans. If they do not convey this legitimacy through appropriate
objectives and actions they will quickly lose their perceived legitimacy. Coupled with concerns
over legitimacy are those of accountability. In using outside partners, public agencies hand over
substantial discretionary authority even though the public agency is ultimately responsible.
Public agencies must perform a careful balancing act between public priorities and concerns and
those of their private counterparts in order to retain both their legitimacy and accountability in
the view of and to the public.
One mechanism that public agencies use to address these challenges is community outreach
and public input. Constituents want to be apprised of plans and have the ability to voice their
opinions and objections through public participation processes. Many public agencies are
mandated to involve community members but do so with varying levels of success. Some
agencies resort to utilizing "tokenistic" 25 versions of community participation that do not give
constituents true power in shaping the plans affecting their lives and surroundings. While to
some it is heretic to claim that community participation processes usually do not yield
meaningful results, they must admit that many times "potential participants seem to care as
much for the right to participate as for the fact of participation." 26 Herein lies the paradox of
community participation: often the process is more important than the results.2 7 Unfortunately
for both constituents and public agencies, agencies seem to be aware of this fact. Participation
is a political requirement for almost all public undertakings, though careful weighing of public
input is not. The public loses out on having a significant role in shaping their environment while
the government loses out on creating richer relationships with the communities it serves and
ideas that could often create longer-lasting success.
A discussion about management and planning in the public sector must also include a discussion
of "bureaucrats," who they are and how they operate. Common discussions about government
24 Inam, 139.
25 Sherry R. Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 35 (1969): 217.
26 James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free
Press, 1989), 48.
27 Inam, 33.
agencies include the perception that they are populated by "incompetent hacks [...who go] to
great lengths to avoid doing the job they were hired to do."2 8 Some theoretical models assume
rational organizations and rational actors who make decisions through rational choice.
Experience tells us these perceptions lie at the extreme of a spectrum of behavior. Most
bureaucrats fall somewhere in the middle. The various tiers of supervision and authority
prevalent in many public agencies provide the room for a wide range of bureaucrat behavior.
Policy is rarely implemented as it is formulated. Its movement down through the ranks creates
many changes unforeseen by those responsible for drafting legislation or regulations. Lipsky's
concept of the "street-level bureaucrat" is useful in understanding how policy is transformed
through modes of implementation and levels of discretion. Their behaviors are affected by the
imposition of rules, management styles, personal beliefs, and expectations. Discretion can be a
source of good or bad behavior since it provides the chance to "intervene on behalf of clients as
well as discriminate among them." 29 Escalating levels of discretion seem to raise the bar on
questionable practices, causing some to move farther away from acceptable behavior but
successful bureaucrats know when, how, and to what degree to utilize their discretion in order
to provide the best service. Street-level managers can be very effective at influencing the
behavior of lower-level bureaucrats due to the fact that their higher position allows them more
connection to the organization's "sense of mission" while still being close enough to lower ranks
to transmit this mission successfully. They can create cultures where appropriate service
provision is encouraged and valued above simply meeting required obligations.
Wilson posits that bureaucracy can be made more "efficient" by giving bureaucrats more
incentives and flexibility, but finds that this conflicts with our political culture. Political interests,
perhaps unfortunately, play a huge role in determining the workings of the public sector and
their interactions with the public. Logically, this must be the case since political interests have
created and shaped most public agencies. Although some agencies would like to operate
independent of them, "no agency head can ever achieve complete autonomy" from democratic
politics.30 Agencies must therefore define their role in and relationships to political interests. If
28 Wilson, xviii.
29 Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy, Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1980), 23.
30 Wilson, 188.
political interests have already defined this relationship, agencies must strive to negotiate its
terms in ways that will provide higher levels of service. The constraint this relationship places on
public organizations is especially important to consider when they operate in the midst of
interest-group politics where numerous interests clamor for public attention and intervention,
and are beholden to politicians for annual funding allocations.
Financial - Fiscal Planning and Practice
Public agencies operate within a myriad of constraints not imposed on private entities that
cause a perceived inefficiency. Decisions are made with uncertain knowledge and intended to
decrease exposure to risk.3' Internal political wrangling and less than optimal patterns of
behavior add to the conditions present in large organizations. These conditions usually create
environments that are more concerned about finding ways to work within constraints than
completing tasks, and in turn focus more on fair methods than successful outcomes.32 Efficiency
in the public sector cannot be judged without consideration of the "costs" of these constraints
and the worth of other publicly valued and demanded outputs.
A central constraint to an organization's functioning is that it "must serve goals not of [its] own
choosing.""3 3 Governments usually form new public organizations to meet an unserved public
need that has come to the forefront. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was
formed amidst rising concerns about workplace safety. Although its first leader could not
influence the role Congress wanted the agency to serve in the public realm, he did have a role in
shaping its priorities and direction the agency would take. In comparison, a private
organization's founders often run it to serve self-defined and self-serving goals.
Another constraint borne by public agencies is that they cannot use revenue as an incentive or
measure for performance. Whereas private organizations regularly use commissions and bonuses
to extract higher levels of performance from their employees, these kinds of practices are illegal
in the public sector. In determining whether or not a particular program or product is financially
viable, the private sector has the assistance of market competition. If a company sells a product
that is faulty or for another reason undesired by the public, the company will soon know that it
31 James March, A Primer on Decisionmaking: How Decisions Happen (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 25.
32 Selznick, 12.
33 Wilson, 115. This section is largely indebted to Wilson's discussion on inefficiency and constraints.
is time to stop production. If a social service agency is running a program that is aimed to
combat juvenile recidivism, the agency will most likely not know what kind of impact the
program is having for years, if ever. The program could be a waste of public funds that will
continue for decades.
A third constraint is the fact that public agencies must adhere to strict guidelines meant to
ensure equity and fairness in public actions. In order to provide equal access to government
contracts, all firms must be considered even though some are more qualified than others. While
private organizations are able to procure equipment that is best suited to their work, public
organizations must usually run purchases through numerous supervisors and acquire those that
are the cheapest instead of those that are the best value. Recently, best value contracts have
become more prevalent but they are still far from being the norm. This constraint also creates a
"bloated bureaucracy" due to the need for multiple levels of supervision.
These constraints severely limit government agencies from behaving in a more "efficient"
manner. Constituents wonder why projects come in over budget and at lengthy delays and
these constraints are often a factor. Paradoxically, these constraints that cause constituent
complaints were created at the behest of constituents. Each constraint has been constructed in
response to demand for it. In addition to their central tasks, public agencies have other valued
outputs like a reputation for integrity, public confidence, and support of important outside
interests. Monetary value cannot account for "maintaining honest behavior, producing fair
allocation of benefits, and generating popular support" in addition to achieving central goals.34
Determining the value of these outputs would begin the process of more fairly judging
government's level of efficiency. Within this system, the private sector will almost always
appear more efficient due to its fewer number of constraints, valued outputs, and goals. This
discussion of government constraints is not meant as an excuse for government behavior. There
are definitely instances in which government is inefficient even allowing for these constraints, as
there are instances of great efficiency in spite of them. The public should not lessen its
expectations of government performance because of these constraints, but be aware of them
when making claims about government efficiency.
34 Wilson, 31 8.
Recent reform theories
Before concluding this chapter I will also touch on recent reform theories that have had a critical
impact in changing the way public organizations work and how they are perceived. One of the
most dominant directions organizational reform has charged towards is the recreation of public
agencies into those that are more "catalytic," "mission-driven," "customer-driven,"
"anticipatory," "market-oriented," etc.35 In other words, public organizations should become
more like private, profit-driven organizations. Osborne and Gaebler are of the belief that
government bureaucracy, created a hundred years ago to combat official corruption, has
outlived its usefulness. Since governments are increasingly caught between declining revenues
and rising demands for service, they must radically restructure themselves and their functions in
order to achieve higher levels of employee empowerment, public support, and efficiency.
Theorists in this camp seem to ignore the fact that the public sector has already become more
like its private counterpart due to the rise of "third-party government."
New Zealand became the poster child for these types of reform in the 1 990s with the adoption
of "managerialism." 36 Managerialism aimed to increase flexibility, promote improvements to
process, and encourage market-style competition. Reformers wanted to "let managers manage,"
and trusted them to do so. A related phenomenon in the world of organizations was new public
management, which also advocates for greater market orientation in the public sector to
achieve greater cost-efficiency. Pollitt presents a sharp critique of new public management by
arguing that some elements of it are exactly what researchers have found to be
counterproductive to successful institutions (i.e., "shifting the basis of employment.., towards
term contracts, performance-related pay," etc). 37 Even when research proves that certain
practices are better than others, organizations continue to use those that are less effective. An
internal contradiction exists in the new public management prescription for public organizations:
"managers are simultaneously encouraged to take more responsibility for the results of their
activity and obliged to surrender significant shares of the authority for achieving those results
35 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public
sector (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992).
36 Donald F. Kettl, "The Global Revolution in Public Management: Driving Themes, Missing Links," Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 16 (1997): 447.
37 Christopher Pollitt, "Justification by Works or by Faith? Evaluating the New Public Management," Evaluation 1 (1995):
147.
to third-party implementers."38 Advocates of reform systems that claim to be panaceas must
keep in mind that all reform efforts, in order to be successful, remain works "in progress that
require constant improvement""39 and evaluation.
This chapter aimed to provide the analytic framework necessary to understand some of the
forces at play at the organizational and environmental levels in the CRA's development of the
Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza. The human, social, and financial elements of organizational
capacity featured more prominently in this endeavor that the technical elements. In summary,
leadership, mission, and culture have extreme importance in setting the course of an agency and
determining how it functions. Breaking from traditional perceptions of hierarchical organizations
with static structures, most public agencies now function in partnership with a wide network of
actors. Evaluations of financial efficiency must take into consideration the environment of
constraints that most public agencies operate within. This framework coupled with the history
of the site in the next chapter will provide the basis for analysis of how successful the CRA is at
carrying out these types of redevelopment projects.
38 Salomon, 1 2.
39 Kettl, 451.
Chapter 3
From Regional Shopping Center to Regional Mall
The site of the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza has had an incredibly interesting but tumultuous
fate. An overview of the site's history will provide the reader with the background to
understand the political, economic, and social conditions that have brought the mall to its
present form. Understanding this history is integral in evaluating the mall's level of success
throughout its various incarnations and how these forms of success or failure manifest. This
chapter also begins to sketch an outline of CRA's modus operandi throughout the site's
redevelopment and the agency's ability for adaptability in the face of changing circumstances.
The site's history is divided into four distinct eras with distinct sets of actors and interests: an
initial period of successful private sector development starting in the late 1940s, a period of
decline that begins in the 1970s, followed by a period of public-sector driven redevelopment
that extends from the 1980s until 2006, and a current phase of redevelopment driven purely
by the private sector. However, the mall's history begins in downtown Los Angeles where the
automobile would have unprecedented changes to the retail sector.
The Exodus from Downtown
Urban centers were rapidly changing by the early 1920s. Bustling downtowns were bursting at
the seams with businesses, pedestrians, trains, but most problematically with personal
automobiles. Although Los Angeles was not nearly as centralized as other cities of the day, it
was facing this same problem but in a different form: train lines connecting dispersed residential
clusters met in downtown. When cars skyrocketed in popularity in the 1910s, Los Angeles'
middle class denizens found their mode of liberation from the already-overburdened rail system.
By 1915, Angelenos were almost eight times more likely than residents of Chicago to own a
car.40 Traffic congestion grew so dire that in 1920 the City Council passed a measure that
banned curbside parking in the core area of downtown during business hours.41 This proved
more effective than government officials had anticipated; downtown businesses reported a
sharp decline in retail transactions. A few months later, the ordinance was reformulated to allow
limited parking during the day and banned parking only during the evening rush hour.
This alleviated some of downtown's decline in sales, but the car continued to present a
challenge. Stores had to convince customers that parking would not be an issue while shopping
in downtown (see Figure 3.1). Retailers that could secure the most contracts with private
parking lots within a few blocks had a definite advantage over those who were in denser parts
Offers Parking Facihties for 18,775 Automrnobes Daily
Within Convenient Reach of the Store!
Figure 3.1 Bullock's newspaper ad42
of downtown. However, these measures were only partial solutions to the desire of customers
to shop without having to worry about parking. Los Angeles County's meteoric population rise
of 936,000 in 1920 to 2,200,000 in 192743 coupled with new residents' love of cars predicted
the need for an entirely new solution. This solution came with the revolutionary idea of moving
department stores out of downtown to other areas of the cities. Developers envisioned creating
40 Fulton, 130.
41 Richard Longstreth, City Center to Regional Mall: Architecture, the Automobile, and Retailing in Los Angeles, 1920-
1950, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), 5.The history of the site until 1950 is largely indebted to Longstreth.
42 Ibid., 211.
43 Ibid., 6.
their own mini-downtowns all over the city. The first example of this move away from the
central city came with the 1929 opening of the Bullock's on Wilshire Boulevard, two miles west
of downtown. 44 Bullock's had not only created a gorgeous new flagship with ample parking in a
yet uncongested area of the city, but also provided valet parking from a lavishly decorated
porte cochere (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Customers had been completely freed from their
Figure 3.2 Bullock's and parking lot 45  Figure 3.3 Bullock's porte cochere4 6
parking worries at the posh new store. Developers and other department stores raced to find
sites where these new amenities could be rivaled.
Concurrently, the country was undergoing a dramatic demographic change. Both the highest
and lowest income groups had declined since 1929 and more people were now considered
middle class. Los Angeles had rebounded from the Depression far sooner than other urban areas
and continued to attract skilled blue-collar workers in large numbers. Increasing amounts of
disposable income also pushed department stores to grow larger in order to carry more and
wider varieties of merchandise. Bullock's, May Company, Broadway, and Sears competed in
creating larger and larger department stores. While May Company announced its extraordinary
$10 million expansion plans in January of 1 945, Broadway kept their plans for a "fully integrated
shopping center" under wraps. 47 For Broadway, these forces represented an opportunity to build
something that went far beyond the plans of other department stores. It had decided to embark
on building a shopping center with one of their department stores alongside numerous smaller
44 Ibid., 11 6.
45 Ibid., 1 1 5.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 227.
retailers. They hoped that this retail clustering would attract more of these middle class clients
than possible with a single store.
The Development of a "Regional Shopping Center" for Los Angeles
The first of these opportunities was found at the intersection of Crenshaw Boulevard and Santa
Barbara Avenue. According to a 1931 map of Los Angeles, a golf course and an airport
occupied the western half of the intersection (see Figure 3.4).48 Broadway's project was among
the earliest to make extensive use of Census data to select a profitable site. The company
analyzed data on ownership rates (40.5 percent in the adjacent tracts, the highest in the
nation) and rent levels. 49 Without this degree of analysis, such a large development would not
have been considered. By 1945 the site had been unoccupied and cleared to make room for the
11 *2 ILA
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Figure 3.4 Intersection of Crenshaw Boulevard and Santa Barbara Avenue s50
first regional shopping center in the metropolitan Los Angeles area, and some say the country.
Broadway had contracted out the leasing arrangements to Coldwell Banker and had arranged for
a master ground lease from the Baldwin Hills Estates of the 35-acre area southwest of the
intersection.s A ground-breaking ceremony for the "Broadway-Crenshaw Center" was held on
October 29, 1945. The plans at the time included a design with mostly stainless steel and black




s' "Broadway Begins Store in Southwest Section," Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1945.
52 "Store Heads Dedicate Broadway-Crenshaw," Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1946.
The steel and housing fell by the wayside as the Broadway focused more on perfecting their
retail mix. This new center did not seek to be in direct competition with downtown or Wilshire's
upscale establishments; it was looking to attract a "budget-conscious" population.53 Broadway
instructed Coldwell Banker to seek and retain retailers that specialized in high-volume, and not
high-value, sales a directive that lead to tenants like Woolworth, Vons (a grocery store), Savon
(a drug store), a bank, auto shop, and others.
Simultaneously, May Company moved forward with independent plans for a store on the
northwest corner of the intersection. This was a major source of tension between the two
competitors. Most of the city was completely unaware that the two sites were being developed
separately and were under the assumption that the two were being developed as one site.
While May Company was also working on including other retailers along with their department
store, their center was not nearly as ambitious or innovative as that of Broadway.
On November 21, 1947 the $6 million Broadway-Crenshaw Center opened5 4 in what was then a
predominantly white, middle class, suburban neighborhood (see Figure 3.5). The complex was
Figure 3.5 Aerial looking east"
s3 Longstreth, 231.
54 "Broadway's New Crenshaw Store to Open Today," Los Angeles Times, November 21, 1947.
ss Longstreth, 230. May Company is the large structure at the far left, while the large structure at the center is
Broadway. Also notice location of tunnel entrance and exit in lower half of photograph, near edges of parking lot.
extremely successful in its early years boasting nearly "550,000 square feet of enclosed space
supplemented by thirteen acres of parking lots designed to hold 2,500 cars at a time."56 One of
the noteworthy innovations of the center was its service tunnel, stretching from Santa Barbara
Avenue to Stocker Avenue, which connected all of the stores underground and eliminated
delivery congestion above ground,5 7 a concept that was widely adopted in subsequent years.
Other significant innovations in retail history were the break with the previously dominant "lone-
wolf" model of department store development as well as the management and leasing control
retained by Broadway to carefully craft the center's appeal. While the center finally gave the car
its rightful place with over ten acres of parking, it did not forget the importance of the
pedestrian traffic along Crenshaw, an increasingly important North-South thoroughfare. To this
end, the stores in the center were designed to have dual-frontages, one towards the parking lot
and another towards the street (see Figures 3.6 and 3.7). Unfortunately, pedestrians were not
as prevalent as the developers had hoped but the importance of the display windows was still
too entrenched to question in the 1940s.
Figure 3.6 Parking lot faCade58  Figure 3.7 Crenshaw faCades"
Although tension was high between Broadway and May Company, they soon realized that two
department stores in such close proximity were an even bigger draw, and that the market
seemed able to sustain both. The Broadway-Crenshaw Center became simply the Crenshaw
Center and a formidable competitor to downtown retail, without meaning to. This competition
was intensified when plans for redeveloping the Santa Barbara Plaza shopping area next-door
surfaced in 1 950. This increased attention to redevelopment in the city was perhaps the result
56 Longstreth, 230.
57 "Broadway's New Crenshaw Store to Open Today,"1 947.
58 Ibid., 232.
59 Ibid., 234.
of the creation of a new city agency a few years before. In 1948 Mayor Bowron created the
Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles under authority of the Community
Redevelopment Act of 1945. 60 The agency was to purchase and "wipe out blighted and slum
areas," then turning them over to private enterprise for development into the "best social and
economic use," a mandate that would continue into the present.
As the years passed, the Santa Barbara Plaza would continue to be the focus of redevelopment
talk that never amounted to much action. In contrast, the Crenshaw Center continued to rise in
popularity into the late 1 950s with numerous businesses choosing to locate offices there.61 The
center expanded in 1962 adding two buildings facing Santa Barbara that would house fifteen
additional tenants.62 This brought the center's total building area to 620,000 square feet.
A Growing Need for Redevelopment
A few years later, the area would begin to see a drastic change accelerated by the Watts Riots.
1965 brought to the forefront decades of racial tension fostered by extreme segregation the
city had previously tried ignoring. While white flight had already begun to the newer suburbs
further way from downtown in small quantities, the riots helped intensify this trend. Middle class
housing stock was thus made available to African-Americans and new immigrants. From 1950 to
1960, Los Angeles County experienced a 111.8 percent jump in African-American residents,
from almost 218,000 to over 461,000.63 61 percent of whites were now living outside the
central city as compared to 53 percent in 1950.64 The high level of African-American
homeownership and quality of housing stock proved a huge draw over Northern cities like New
York and Chicago.
By the early 1970s, the demographic shift of the surrounding neighborhood was complete. A
newspaper article cites the May Company salon as the highest grossing department store salon
60 "Doom for Urban Blight," Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1948.
61 "$190,000 Office Building Ready," Los Angeles Times, September 9, 1956 and "Firm Occupies New Building," Los
Angeles Times, July 28, 1957.
62 "Shop Center in Final Phase of Construction," Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1962.
63 U.S. Bureau of the Census, "U.S. Census of Population: 1960. Supplementary Reports, Series PC(S1 )-52, Negro
Population, by County: 1960 and 1950." 1966.
64 U.S. Bureau of the Census, "U.S. Census of Population: 1960. Selected Area Reports, Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas. Final Report PC(3)-1D," 1963.
in the city.65 The salon was newsworthy because it had an entirely black staff and a
predominantly "upper-middle class" black clientele. These customers were coming from the hills
to the west of the site, from neighborhoods like Baldwin Hills and View Park. To the east in the
flatlands, a very different type of neighborhood was developing. While a stable Japanese
enclave developed in Jefferson Park to the northeast, others areas had begun to show signs of
"economic blight and decay."' '66
The area was identified as one of concern by the city in 1974 with the Planning Department-
sponsored "Southwest Area Plan."6 7 Mayor Tom Bradley, elected the first and only Black mayor
of the city the previous year, had instructed the Planning Department to look specifically at
housing, transportation, business, jobs, and crime. Little action seems to have come from this
plan and in 1977 Councilwoman Pat Russell aided a newly formed community group, the Greater
Crenshaw Revitalization Agency (GCRA), to commission a study on the revitalization of the
area.6 8 The Community Development Department was pinpointed as the lead coordinating
agency for the revitalization project, which was to include mainly tenant-funded improvements
to the shopping center and surrounding streets. Community members and politicians alike were
concerned that a failure to address the continuing middle class exodus in the area would result
in it becoming a "mere extension of South Central with all of South Central's problems." 69
The study, completed in 1979, found numerous factors contributing to the Crenshaw area's
downturn. The Crenshaw Center was extremely outdated compared to other local retail centers,
most notably the Fox Hills Mall, which opened five miles to the west in 1975. The center's
central location was an asset, but also a drawback since it made leaving the area easy. Instead
of shopping locally, residents were spending 60 percent of their disposable income outside of
the area. Residents complained about merchandise quality at the mall while retailers maintained
they stocked what sold in a circular debate. The study also found that the neighborhood's racial
makeup had changed even more drastically in the previous twenty years. When in 1960 the
area's population was 63 percent white, it stood at 10 percent in 1980.70 While this racial shift
65 "Department Store Innovation: All-Black Salon No. 1 Money-maker," Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1973.
66 "Lead Agency for Crenshaw Area Revitalization Chosen," Los Angeles Times, November 27, 1977.
67 Doug Smith, "Southwest Area Plan Completed," LosAngeles Times, March 22, 1974.
68 "Lead Agency for Crenshaw Area Revitalization Chosen," 1977.
69 Austin Scott, "Crenshaw Given Warning on Seeds of Urban Blight," Los Angeles Times, September 23, 1979.
70 William Overend, "Problems Stall Proposed Crenshaw Redevelopment," Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1980.
did not accompany an income level change, it was accompanied by a decrease in city services.
The study recommended residents start the area's revitalization with individual actions like
shopping at local retailers, a recommendation that is still heard today. However, most residents
continued shopping in other areas of the city and the area continued its slow decline.
Whatever momentum the study and its results created was lost after a protracted battle over
signage and a power struggle between two factions of the GCRA. In 1982, the Los Angeles
Urban League, an organization specializing in job development, training, and leadership, received
a contract from the city to bring economic growth to the area." Their first order of business:
another unsuccessful attempt to put up new signs in the area. The League was able to hold a
daylong event showcasing local businesses but not much else. The community-run revitalization
efforts had by most accounts failed. Mayor Bradley, often accused of not paying sufficient
attention to the South Los Angeles although raised there, finally conceded the need to have
further city involvement in the area. Some speculate that the move to redevelop the center was
perhaps his attempt at "saving his legacy" in the area.72 In 1983, he along with State Senator
Diane Watson intensified the push for the CRA to become involved in the area.73 Senator
Watson was instrumental in forming the Crenshaw Community Advisory Committee (CCAC),
which created community pressure for action and still remains the citizen oversight organization
over the project area.
Public Sector Driven Redevelopment
The original Crenshaw Redevelopment Plan was adopted by the City Council on May 9, 1984. 74 It
outlined a $50 to $60 million redevelopment of the Crenshaw Redevelopment Area, the 54-acre
site of the current mall, which would include a bridge over Santa Barbara Avenue that would
finally connect the two halves of the center and the addition of a third anchor store. At this
point the center consisted of twenty-three interconnected buildings and thirteen freestanding
structures, containing 860,000 gross square feet. 75 Many of the buildings were under-utilized
and in need of repair, as some had not seen improvements since their initial construction. The
71 Austin Scott, "Urban League Takes Task of Spurring Crenshaw Revival," Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1 982.
72 Erin Aubry, Interview with the author, February 25, 2009.
73 CRA/LA, Crenshaw Redevelopment Project, 1991: Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza, 1 991.
74 Janet Clayton, "Shopping Mall Gets Second Chance: Council Authorizes First Step in Crenshaw Redevelopment," Los
Angeles Times, May 3, 1984.
75 CRA/LA, "First Amendment to the Crenshaw Redevelopment Plan for the Crenshaw Redevelopment Project," 1994.
project suffered substantial delays due to a denial of funding from the federal government76 and
the possible vulnerability to fault lines under the site.77
After securing additional funds through bonds, the CRA reached an agreement with Southern
California's leading retail developer Alexander Haagen in early 1985 to transform the center into
a $1 00-million enclosed shopping mall.78 The CRA agreed to acquire the land through purchase
and eminent domain and sell the land to Haagen for construction and development. The two
would then share the mall's profits. Concerns about the existing anchors deserting the center
were assuaged when they announced that they would stay through the redevelopment and
would donate their land to the CRA. Shortly after, Sears announced its plan to become the new
mall's third anchor store7 9 after being convinced to close down a store in the Mid-City
neighborhood a few miles to the north. 80
In 1986, the aging shopping center began its (
shops to the site. 81 Two years later, the $120
Figure 3.8 Mall entrance at dusk" '
conversion into a modern mall that would add 120
million overhaul of the center was complete. 82
Figure 3.9 Pedestrian bridge over Martin Luther King Blvd.
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Los Angeles Times, August 12, 1985.
78 Bill Boyarsky, "$51 -Million Plan to Save Crenshaw Center is Revived," Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1985.
79 Cathleen Decker, "Sears Planned: Crenshaw Mall on Rebound," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1986.
80 Valerie Shaw, Interview with the author, March 26, 2009.
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Figure 3.10 Interior of mall
The mall reopened as the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza with a pedestrian bridge over what was
now Martin Luther King Boulevard connecting the two sides of the complex (see Figure 3.9).
The mall was able to celebrate another important first this time around: "the nation's first major
enclosed mall to open in a mostly black urban community."84 The mall would prove to be a
testing ground for potential future developments in similar neighborhoods. Developers across
the country would follow the mall closely in its early years to decide whether similar investment
in minority, inner-city neighborhoods was worthwhile.
A few weeks after opening, a Los Angeles Times editorial proclaimed "New Mall; It's Working," 8 s
but the Crenshaw Plaza did not live up to expectations. A year after its opening, only 67 of the
100 available store spaces were leased although anchor stores were faring well.86 Initial plans to
add a fourth anchor to the mall"' were not realized. National chains, not used to locating in
minority areas, waited for initial sales results only prolonging the mall's initial lease-up woes.
Some in the community attributed their resistance to blatant racism.88 Adding to this sluggish
start were high rental rates; rent ranged between $28 and $36 per square foot at the Crenshaw
Plaza while the Fox Hills Mall rates were between $1 5 and $20 per square foot.89 Attempts to
attract other major retailers were numerous but none were successful. Councilwoman Ruth
84 Shiver, 1988.
85 "New Mall; It's Working," LosAngeles Times, November 19, 1988.
86 Jube Shiver, "Revitalized Crenshaw Plaza Striving Toward Success," Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1989.
87 Decker, 1986.
88 John W. Mack, "The Color of Money," Los Angeles Times, December 19, 1991.
89 Shiver, 1989.
Figure 3.11 Food court
Galanter (elected in 1 987) shot down a plan to bring an IKEA to the northern half of the site
due to traffic concerns.90 Even though property values in the surrounding areas reportedly went
up, the mall continued to struggle into the early 1 990s. Middle income customers continued to
cite the lower quality merchandise stocked by the anchors as the main reason they continued to
shop elsewhere. All these factors left the mall ranking 4 3 in overall sales among the nation's
45 largest malls.91
It appeared that the mall might have better times in store with the 1991 announcement that
the Lucky supermarket chain planned to open a 43,000 square foot store at the northern end
of the site as a result of numerous petitions from community members and Galanter herself. 92
This would be the first supermarket to open in the area since the Watts Riots. Another boost
came in the form of the CRA's announcement a few months later of plans to revitalize Santa
Barbara Plaza, which at the time housed the largest concentration of black-owned businesses in
the city.93 The supermarket opened in early April of 1992 to large crowds.94 These victories
were quickly tempered with the civil disturbances that begun a few days later, which decimated
many areas of South Los Angeles including those around the mall. 9s While the mall was "at the
epicenter of some of the worst riot damage, [...it] was relatively unscathed;" Haagen officials
credited this to the site's otherwise heavily criticized black iron fence and its private security
force.96
Ironically, instead of providing proof to reluctant tenants of area's instability, potential tenants
began to see the mall as a secure location because it was largely unharmed. Mall sales jumped
after the riots, partially due to the destruction of local competition, but it still maintained a 30
percent vacancy rate." A few months after the riots, the mall received commitments from
national chains like the Disney Store, Gap, and See's Candies to locate in the mall, commitments
that would have lowered its vacancy rate to 10 percent.98 This move brought criticism from
90 John L. Mitchell, "Galanter Opposed Ikea Store for Crenshaw Development," Los Angeles Times, January 3, 1991.
91 "Redone Mall Struggles to Bounce Back," Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1990.
92 John L. Mitchell, "Major Supermarket in Store for Area Without One Since Watts Riot," Los Angeles Times, April 6,
1991.
93 "Crenshaw Shopping Mall Study OKd," Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1991.
94 Karen G. Bates, "Perspective on Consumers: If You Build It, They Will Come," Los Angeles Times, April 1 6, 1992.
9s "Riot Aftermath," Los Angeles Times, May 7, 1992.
" Timothy Williams, "Calamity Breathes New Life Into Recession-Plagued Mall," Los Angeles Times, November 1 5, 1992.
97 Nina J. Easton, "Bringing it All Back Home," Los Angeles Times, October 26, 1992.
98 Timothy Williams, "Calamity Breathes New-Life Into Recession Plagued Mall," Los Angeles Times, November 1 5, 1992.
community members that wanted local retailers to populate the mall while another faction
praised the move, citing the lack of national retailers as the reason why more affluent
customers avoided the mall.
As the mall was on an upswing after the riots, the surrounding area was quickly worsening.
Numerous stores in the neighborhood remained boarded up well into the next year. The
Crenshaw Chamber of Commerce started a "Buy Crenshaw" campaign in mid-1i 993 to try to
raise awareness of the retailers and goods remaining in the area. 99 Higher income residents were
wary of the types of businesses they felt were overwhelming their neighborhood without being
representative of the potential clientele. On a given block there are numerous wig shops, hair
and nail salons, as well as liquor stores (see Figure 3.12). The earthquake in early 1994 caused
Figure 3.12 Crenshaw storefronts1 00
additional damage, forcing Robinsons-May to close for six months.10' It reopened with new paint
and flooring, and with a new mix of merchandise. Store officials claimed the earthquake provided
the perfect opportunity for these long-planned upgrades. However, these were not enough to
bring more customers to the mall, nor all of its former customers. Some simply found other
malls to frequent during the repairs and never found their way back.
As a response to these deteriorating conditions, new Councilman Mark Ridley-Thomas explored
the idea of expanding the project area to include Santa Barbara Plaza and other properties along
the Crenshaw commercial corridor. The amendment to the project area was adopted on
99 Erin J. Aubry, "Crenshaw Chamber Zeroes in on Local Shoppers," Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1993.
100 Author.
lo0 Erin J. Aubry, "Baldwin Hills Robinsons-May Gets Repairs, New Stock," LosAngeles Times, April 17, 1994.
December 6, 1994 and added approximately 150 acres to the original 54-acre project area10 2
(see Figure 3.13). The CRA would funnel $75 million into improving the faqades of businesses,












Figure 3.13 Expanded Crenshaw Project Area104
While the CRA was working out the details of the new project area, they also dealt with
questionable actions by Haagen. He sold the mall without the consent or knowledge of the CRA
to a real estate investment trust he controlled, Alexander Haagen Properties, of which Mayor
102 CRA/LA, 1994.
103 Erin J. Aubry, "CRA Project Moves Forward Redevelopment," Los Angeles Times, December 11, 1994.
104 CRA/LA, "Crenshaw & Amended Crenshaw Redevelopment Projects: 5-Year Implementation Plan FY2005 - FY2009,"
2007.
Bradley was board member.10 s This move effectively cut the CRA out of any potential profits.
Haagen held that this sale did not violate his contract with the CRA and that he was forced into
this maneuver due to the mall's continued losses. As Haagen was dissolving his partnership with
the CRA, he was also urging the agency to approve a $1.5 million loan to the Johnson
Development Corporation (headed by former Los Angeles Lakers superstar basketball player
Earvin "Magic" Johnson) for a proposed theater complex at the mall. The theaters were to
finally bring the mall into the black. The theater deal was put on hold while Haagen and the CRA
reached a new agreement; Haagen would keep any profits for two years and then return to
sharing profits evenly.106
Sony Theatres and JDC had announced earlier in the year a joint venture to bring an $11 million,
twelve-screen theater complex to the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza. 107 When the theaters
opened to celebrity appearances and unprecedented crowds in mid-1i 995, they were the largest
in Los Angeles seating 3,700108 (see Figure 3.14). A year later, first floor stores in the mall
Figure 3.14 Magic Theatreso0 9
reported a revenue increase of up to 50 percent for some establishments and a vacancy rate
decline of 17 percent (from 20 to 3 percent). 110 The theaters performed very well their first
year becoming one of the top-grossing theaters in the country with over 1 million patrons. 1'
105 John L. Mitchell, "L.A. Says developer Has Cut It Out of Share in Mall Business," Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1994.
106 James Rainey, "Mall to get Theaters; City to be Paid," Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1994.
107 Erin J. Aubry, "Magic Johnson, Sony to Open 1 2-Screen Theater in Baldwin Hills," Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1994.
108 Erin J. Aubry, "Magic Debut for Inner-City Movie House Entertainment," Los Angeles Times, July 9, 1995.
109 Author.
110 Steve Chagollan, "Left Screened Out," Daily Variety, February 10, 2009.
111 Ted Johnson, "Magic Chain Grows by 14: Johnson Theatres, Sony plan 14-site expansion," Daily Variety, February 10,
JDC quickly announced plans to expand to fifteen screens in 1998. They planned to further
build off of this success by helming the $100 million redevelopment of the Santa Barbara
Plaza. 11 The mall enjoyed what some see as its most successful years in the late 1990s.
By this time the mall's original anchors had morphed into Robinsons-May (formerly May
Company) and Macy's (formerly Broadway) after a series of department store sales and
mergers. The initial boost caused by the theater addition (a 95 percent occupancy rate at the
end of 1995113) dissipated and by 1998 the mall's sales per square foot rate was $31 below
the national average for comparable malls. Major retailers, like the Gap, pulled out after years of
losses. A major setback came in early 1999 when Macy's abruptly closed its stores in Crenshaw
and Westwood claiming they were "underperforming."" 4 Employees showing up to work one
morning were informed the store was closed. Macy's informed Haagen's company with a phone
call later in the day. Mall executives had to pass this information along to the CRA and the
Council office. Local residents and mall tenants feared that Macy's departure would significantly
slow business and aggravate the mall's declining sales even further.
Ridley-Thomas promised to start looking for a replacement tenant immediately. In mid-1i 999
Wal-mart expressed interest in becoming the mall's third anchor." 5 Those critical of the chain
worried that the bargain retailer would lower the profile of the mall, a trend they believe started
with the addition of T.J. Maxx in 1994.116 They feared these types of retailers would not bring
higher income customers down from the hills. Ridley-Thomas disagreed and worked to secure
Wal-mart. The retailing giant announced plans to become the mall's third anchor in 2000117 and
opened three years later, bringing 450 jobs to the area.'18 This would mark one of Wal-mart's
first entries into the metropolitan Los Angeles market and its first three-story store. Wal-mart's
"race to the bottom" in terms of employee wages and benefits was another concern. The store
promised benefits for both full- and part-time employees. Wages averaged $9.50 an hour, just
above the $8.71 average earned by unionized supermarket workers nearby. Increased
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pedestrian traffic and mall sales after Wal-mart's opening assuaged the fears of nearby retailers
of being put out of business. The mall's vacancy rate dropped from 20 percent to 5 percent in
the three years after the store's opening." 19 There was also a dramatic increase in average sales
per square foot, jumping from $350 in 2002 to almost $500 in 2005 for non-anchor stores.120
This substantial gain still reflected performance below other area malls like the Beverly Center
and Glendale Galleria,'21 but above the national average of $366 per square foot.122
A Return to Private Development
Even though Wal-mart would prove a stabilizing force, the mall's ownership changed three times
in less than three years. The largest shopping center operator on the West Coast, Pan Pacific
Retail Properties, purchased Center Trust (Haagen's renamed company) for $219 million in
November of 2002. Five months later, Hager Pacific Properties purchased the mall for $68
million. After only small physical improvements, Hager was able to sell the mall to Capri Capital
Advisors, LLC for $136 million in late 2005123 after a bidding war between twenty companies, 2 4
among them JDC and Westfield. Capri, the largest black-owned real estate investment business
in the country, envisioned a $100 million mixed-use redevelopment. Capri had recently begun to
focus on inner-city retail development, what it considered one of the country's greatest
untapped investment opportunities, with other high-profile projects in Chicago and Baltimore.
In late 2008, the CRA issued an environmental notice of preparation for this redevelopment. A
comparison between the current site plan and Capri's proposal demonstrates how drastic this
transformation will be (see Figures 3.15 and 3.16).125 Capri's plans include a mixed-use retail,
office, hotel, and residential center totaling approximately 3,500,000 square feet of developed
floor area to be built over several phases. The proposal would increase the retail area by
770,000 square feet, add 150,000 square feet of office space, a 400-room hotel, and 1,000
mixed-income dwelling units. Capri presented these plans through an outreach consultant to city
and CRA officials as well as community groups in various meetings before any public hearings
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Figure 3.15 Existing site plan l2 6
on the expansion.128 Officials report that the plans were very well received. Capri is currently
working on revamping the financing structure that previously relied too heavily on public
subsidies with terms more amenable to the CRA.
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Numerous forces have shaped the mall throughout its history. A series of actors and interests
have been introduced through this history, which has traced the mall's evolution from a regional
shopping center to a regional mall. It has also presented the numerous challenges the mall has
faced in its quest to become a successful inner-city establishment. It is in this environment that
the CRA has been tasked with being the public steward of its revitalization. The following
chapter will analyze how well it has taken on this challenge as an organization, both at the
agency and project levels.
128 Billy Chun, Interview with the author, February 23, 2009.
Chapter 4
CRA's Organizational Performance in Redeveloping the Baldwin Hills
Crenshaw Plaza
The CRA has taken on various roles since its initial involvement in the site of the Baldwin Hills
Crenshaw Plaza: purchasing agent, facilitator between the public and private sectors, watchdog,
negotiator, advocate, and so on. The CRA has been quite successful in carrying out some of
these roles but much less successful in others. This chapter will focus on the different tasks and
roles it has undertaken as an agency and in relation to the redevelopment of the mall in order to
evaluate where the CRA's strengths and weaknesses lie in carrying out large-scale inner-city
redevelopment projects. It will also present a modified definition of organizational capacity as it
pertains to the CRA in this case. A discussion of the elements of organizational capacity that
feature most prominently in the CRA's work-its informal structure's influence on leadership
development, the influence of politically driven relationships, and the agency's definition of its
mission and central tasks-will follow.
Organizational Capacity Redefined
Our understanding of organizational capacity must be flexible enough to adapt to specific cases
and contexts to highlight its most important features. At the outset of this analysis,
organizational capacity was defined as "the ability to organize the human, technical, financial,
and social resources of an organization into an effective collective enterprise." Just as the initial
collection of information demonstrated the need to exclude technical resources from further
analysis, this definition must be further refined moving forward. At this juncture, it is important
to revisit the concept of organizational capacity and modify it as it pertains to this case study
and as is relevant to CRA's work. This strategic modification of our understanding of
organizational capacity helps us comprehend its most significant elements in a particular case
and sheds light on specific ways of strengthening an organization's capacity in order to move
particular types of efforts (for example, urban redevelopment) forward. Based on empirical
research conducted through this case study, I have found that the organization of human and
social resources is intricately linked and especially important. While financial resources played an
important role in determining the agency's amount of work and its roles within this work, it did
not play a crucial role in defining the central tasks of the agency. Closer attention to the human
and social resources within CRA would yield more significant organizational change.
These two elements must therefore be the basis for a modified definition of organizational
capacity as is relevant to this case study. The features that played the most prominent roles in
terms of human resources were the lack of internal leadership and the broad definition of
mission and central tasks. In terms of social resources, these were politically dominated
relationships and the organization of the agency into networks of actors rather than traditional
hierarchies. This leads to the key features of organizational capacity for CRA: cultivating internal
leadership, concretely defining mission and central tasks, negotiating power-balanced
relationships, and managing their network of actors (see Table 4.1).
Organizational Capacity
Type of Resources Key Features
Human Leadership and Mission
Cultivation of Intemal Leadership
Concrete Mission and Central Tasks
Social Relationships and Networks
Power-Balanced Relationships
Managing Network of Actors
Table 4.1 Important Features of Organizational Capacity for CRA 129
An operational and strategic definition of organizational capacity for the CRA can be formulated
within this new framework. The new definition that will be used to analyze this case study is:
Organizational Capacity - the ability of the CRA to organize its human and social
resources in ways that yield successful urban redevelopment outcomes with regards
129 Author.
to the following features:
Human -4 Leadership and Mission
Social -> Relationships and Networks
The following discussion of human and social resources will be intertwined as the key features of
organizational capacity operated interdependently.
Structural Interference of Leadership Development
The CRA's formal organization chart shows a board of seven commissioners at its helm (see
Figure 4.1). They are appointed by the Mayor and ratified by the City Council. The board
appoints the agency's chief executive officer, usually from candidates recommended by the
Mayor. These top two levels of administration are the only levels that remained unchanged
during the 2004 restructuring under Robert Ovrom, a former Burbank city manager who
I I
Techcal Servces & Housig
Program Developmert
Figure 4.1 CRA Organization Chart 130
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managed to completely transform its downtown. 1" Under the CEO are four other agency-wide
executives and seven regional administrators. Ovrom created the seven new regions with local
headquarters in order to get employees out of downtown and closer to the areas they served.
The new areas-East Valley, West Valley, Hollywood and Central, Downtown, East Los Angeles,
South Los Angeles, and Harbor-Watts-each had their own manager that oversaw a group of
geographically adjacent project areas. Under the new system, regional managers would be
exempt from civil service protection, and thus could be hired or fired at the CEO's discretion.
The branch of the chart with "Regional Project Clusters" was entirely new in 2004.
There are obvious advantages to disseminating human resources across the city instead of
having them concentrated in downtown. However, this appears to have created regional clusters
that are extremely isolated from program areas like housing and resources like information
technology. The reorganized structure has been widely recognized as an improvement but
should not be seen as static or accurate. The organizational chart does not reflect the Mayor
and Council's power over the agency, nor does it acknowledge the role community members or
third parties play in executing the agency's work.
As we know from Salomon's work, few agencies function in ways that are consistent with such
organizational charts. Their actors are more accurately organized into networks brought
together for specific projects. Each actor or group comes to the table with competing interests
and different levels of power. The network of actors that decided the terms of the 1984
redevelopment consisted of the Mayor, the Council member, a state senator, downtown CRA
administrators, the CCAC, and Haagen's company. These actors were brought together in
response to community outcry over the deteriorating conditions at the shopping center, an
issue around which politicians formed committees to pressure the city into action.
Mayor Bradley became involved in response to this pressure and to criticism for his lack of
previous or substantial involvement in the area. During his time in office he made downtown
redevelopment the showpiece of his administration rather than community development in
needier areas of the city. The Mayor then brought on the CRA to prepare a proposal to adopt
131 Brad Smith, "CRA reorganization: getting close to the community," San Fernando Valley Business Journal, August 30,
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the center as a project area. Here we also see the involvement of third party consulting
agencies that conducted the studies necessary for the proposal preparation. The proposal was
then brought to the CRA board and the City Council for approval. Before the proposal was even
ready, machinations behind the scenes to get Haagen on board to redevelop the property had
already begun.
By this time, Haagen had established a "lucrative monopoly over the retail recolonization of
South-central Los Angeles" 132 through his connections with and contributions to numerous city
politicians, both Republican and Democrat, including Bradley. It took this number of internal and
external actors to set into motion the redevelopment of the center, a structure and chain of
command very different from that presented by the agency's organizational chart.
The leaders for redevelopment projects in Los Angeles often do not come from within the ranks
of the CRA but in the form of politicians. The leader of this project in its early stages was
Bradley; he was the single most important actor in moving this project forward. Although
Haagen was already very experienced in inner-city retail development, he did not jump at the
chance of redeveloping the center, nor did any other developer. After an open request for
qualifications, he was the only respondent. Apparently it took a lot of "money on the table" in
public subsidies and assistance as well as a personal request from Bradley to get Haagen
involved.'3 3 Another crucial step in getting the plans for the mall to move forward was another
personal plea from Bradley to May Company and the Broadway.'13 4 The stores, long neglected
and underperforming were on the brink of closure. If Bradley had not personally intervened, the
department stores would have closed and killed any possibility of redevelopment.
Ridley-Thomas in his active lobbying to convince Wal-mart to become an anchor tenant is
another example of politicians playing a major role in setting the mall's course for development.
Waiting for a Nordstrom or even a Nordstrom rack, a chain heavily desired by more affluent
neighbors, seemed unrealistic at a point when the mall had seen years of losses. He believed
that "something was better than nothing"'3 5 in an area historically neglected by the retail sector
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and starved for investment. Ridley-Thomas was also at the forefront during the selection of a
developer for Santa Barbara Plaza. Ridley-Thomas threw his weight behind Christopher
Hammond. This venture has unfortunately not fared as well: Hammond has numerous lawsuits
pending against him from unpaid contractors and creditors, and the redevelopment has yet to
start after millions in public expenditure.'36
In the media coverage of the mall's redevelopments, no CRA staff members were described as
leaders in accordance with Wilson and Ostroff's definitions. The agents of change and visioning
came from the political world. An example of a leader within the CRA, although not directly tied
to this project, was Ovrom. He was able to redefine the agency's structure and redistribute
authority in ways he thought would enable the successful completion of central tasks. Kotter
might term him more accurately as a leader-manager but the changes he made to the agency
are still visible today. They have been strong enough to withstand numerous changes in
management. However, Ovrom fell short of redefining the agency's scope and areas of work.
This is most likely a result of the way the CRA has been set up to function. On top of the fact
that project areas are established at the request of politicians, the City Council must approve all
CRA actions. 37 The organizational chart does not reflect any of this. This chain of command has
created an environment where genuine leaders cannot be fostered within the agency. A
meaningful change in the CRA structure would not only need strong support from within the
agency, but would also have to garner support from the City Council. This seems unlikely, as it
would entail a loss of great political power.
Politically Driven Relationships
The CRA works within a complex network of actors in the public, private, and community
sectors. Instead of responding directly to the public and its needs, the CRA responds to these
needs through intermediaries in the political system, whether they be mayors, Council members,
or others. The agency is not insulated from public pressure as Salamon would claim, but they
are twice removed from it. What the agency feels more acutely is political pressure. The senior
project manager for the Crenshaw area perceives his job performance as being measured by
136 "The Santa Barbara Plaza flop," Los Angeles Times, May 2, 2008.
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"keeping the Council office satisfied.""' 38 Council staff are tasked with getting regular updates on
project progress and timelines from the CRA. A principal CRA task is responding to these queries
in a timely manner. In regards to determining project or priority areas, "if the elected official [is
not] interested, [CRA is] not there."'3 9 Of course this is also a result of the formal project area
selection process and the agency's mandate to work only within ratified project areas, but it
also has a larger importance. CRA staff are so closely tied to elected officials and their desires
for project areas that they are not even allowed to envision what farther reaching plans might
exist.
As stated earlier, most public agencies do not have the liberty to achieve autonomy from
political interests. Inam found that relatively autonomous planning institutions can have
significant outcomes on urban planning and development. 140 The CRA's lack of autonomy has
perhaps been one of its major impediments. Beholden to mayoral and Council interests, the
agency has never had a chance to formulate comprehensive redevelopment visions for its
project areas nor for the city. This is where the most serious problem lies. The city is spending
hundreds of millions of dollars each year in public funds and employing hundreds of individuals
tasked with looking at redevelopment in an overly myopic way. Targeted redevelopment
projects tied to short-term officials will not yield the long-term redevelopment outcomes some
areas of the city and the city as a whole desperately needs.
High levels of political involvement and pressure have also weakened the CRA's ability to ensure
appropriate use of public funds. Politicians have had mixed results in determining the
development outcomes of the mall. Bradley got Haagen on board, but Haagen's involvement
required a questionable amount of public subsidy. His sale of the mall is another example of how
the public good might have been sacrificed for private gain. Ridley-Thomas' support for
Hammond in the redevelopment of the Santa Barbara Plaza is another instance of political
pressure getting in the way of sound decision-making. The fallout from Haagen and Hammond's
actions falls squarely on the shoulders of the CRA, for it remains the public entity responsible
for the project even though politicians are primarily responsible for these deals.
138 Al Jenkins, Interview with the author, February 23, 2009.
139 Ibid.
140 Inam, 110.
The relationship between Haagen and the CRA was a formal public-private partnership and not
one of true cooperation. If true cooperation existed between the two parties, the sale by
Haagen would not have occurred without consultation and agreement on the agency's part. The
agency's relationship with Haagen is also representative of many of the challenges that Salamon
believes arise when private entities become involved in public endeavors. The CRA and Haagen
had different organizational and operating styles (pluriformity) and sets of incentives and goals
for the project (self-referentiality). Haagen's involvement, as others in the private sector, was
motivated by "marketability, competition, and high returns,"' 4 while the CRA's goals in
redevelopment were much broader. The terms of their relationship also changed over time
(dynamism). At the outset, there must have been greater levels of communication between the
two in order to reach an initial agreement. Haagen possibly lost interest in maintaining the
relationship due to continued losses, leading to the unilateral sale of the mall.
There was also an asymmetric interdependency between the two actors. From CRA's
perspective, they were in dire need of Haagen's participation since no other developer was
willing to take on the project. This unequal partnership was also evident in Loukaitou-Sideris and
Banerjee's study of CRA's redevelopment of downtown. They found that the "balance of power
often tilted toward the private sector: developers usually set the terms of the negotiation
process."' 42 While Haagen indeed had the upper hand in negotiating the terms of the Baldwin
Hills Crenshaw Plaza agreement, public agencies often undervalue what they bring to the table.
In numerous instances of public redevelopment, developers are highly dependent on public
subsidy. To some developers' chagrin, the CRA board has realized this fact with some members
contending that any decision that benefits developers financially-a height increase, reduction
in open space requirements or change in zoning-is reason to ask for more community benefit
concessions like job training and low-income housing. 143
The CRA has also had a difficult relationship with another set of actors, community members.
According to another project manager for the Crenshaw project area, this results from a history
of mistrust in the agency largely due to its powers of eminent domain. 44 Local home and
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business owners are wary of the agency's use of eminent domain: some considered the 1994
expansion of the project area as a "land grab." 145 According to CRA regulations, the agency only
retains eminent domain powers up to ten years after the adoption of a project area. For the
Crenshaw project area, this power expired in 2004 but the fear in the community remains. The
CRA also has a greater amount of contact with community members than other city agencies.
Staff believe that this is another source of difficulty in their relationship: since members of the
public do not "have the forum to vent about a lot of community issues, they complain to [CRA]
about things not under [their] purview." 146 When these issues go unresolved, the result is the
perception of an unresponsive agency.
Since the opening of the mall, the community has not been able to organize into an effective
coalition. Communities usually organize against plans or with the aim to alter their direction. 147
Since there has been no substantive plan to alter the mall since its creation (other than the one
currently circulating), there has been no unifying cause around which to organize. The main area
of community discord surrounding the mall is disagreement over its target audience. One vocal,
and more involved, faction would redevelop the mall with its wealthier neighbors to the west in
mind, and another would cater to the lower income residents to the east and south. The CRA is
pulled in these two different directions. Up until recently, those in charge of charting the course
for the mall-politicians, developers, and the agency-had evidently believed one of these was
the more economically viable route (the new plans include a luxury hotel). Much more is needed
of the community organization in order to be truly representative of the range of community
interests and desires. A representative body that could reconcile these divergent views into one
well-articulated vision for the mall's redevelopment would be extremely valuable in directing
future Council member and CRA actions.
Broadly Defined Mission and Central Tasks
A comprehensive mission statement is at the core of how the CRA internally defines its work.
The agency has an eight-part mission that goes far beyond simply acquiring and selling land to
the private sector. The current mission outlines the following goals:
* attract private investment into economically depressed communities
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* eliminate slums, abandoned or unsafe properties and blight throughout Los Angeles
* revitalize older neighborhoods through historic preservation, rehabilitation, and new
development
* build housing for all income levels
* encourage economic development
* create and retain employment opportunities
* support the best in urban design, architecture, and the arts
" ensure the broadest possible citizen participation in its activities"48
The mission statement goes on to say that the agency takes direction from the Mayor and City
Council, and is overseen by a board of seven commissioners.
Judging by the parameters set out by Zimmerman, this statement is moderately successful. It
includes the agency's purpose, sets parameters for its work, and the goals laid out are
"translatable into concrete actions." 149 It is less successful in being motivational or inspirational,
helping evaluate performance, and conveying the agency's values. The mission statement does
not make a connection between its goals and desired ends. Since the statement falters in
inspiring, the agency could work on creating a vision statement to address its vision for the city
and how its work can bring this about. The mission also does not state how the success of their
work can be measured. If the agency works towards these goals in hopes of improving the
quality of life of Los Angeles residents, or increasing the number of jobs or housing units in an
area, this should be explicitly stated.
Another weakness of the statement is its breadth. According to its current mission, the CRA
can undertake activities ranging from building homes for the wealthy, demolishing blighted
properties, and supporting the arts. This breadth makes the agency seem like "such a flexible
organization"'15 to some staff members. To critics, this could easily seem like the agency needs
to do a better job of defining its central tasks. Expanding or narrowing the mission or vision of
an agency results in nothing if these revisions are not inculcated in staff of all levels. Of its
eight-part mission, the most memorable concept to CRA staff is eliminating blight. When asked
about the mission of the agency, both project managers responded, "to eliminate blight." One
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couched this as being the broad mandate amongst additional goals, but the other manager only
recalled this phrase. Other CRA staff recalled some of the other seven goals, but blight removal
was always amongst the first mentioned.
CRA staff are being informally trained to focus on a narrow set of objectives, versus viewing the
agency's mission as more comprehensive. The agency's culture is reinforcing that one of their
most important functions is that of blight elimination. In its original redevelopment of the site,
CRA staff worked mainly in drafting the redevelopment plan and assembling and clearing the
parcels for private redevelopment. If the CRA saw its central role in redeveloping the mall as the
elimination of blight, then the project would most definitely be considered a success. Although
it is not the most profitable mall in the area, there are no longer decrepit and vacant structures
occupying the land. This tendency to distill goals into a singular sound bite results in a
workforce that is far more task than goal-oriented. In carrying out this project, the agency was
more concerned with completing tasks that would lead to blight removal than those that would
lead to the development of a successful mall.
Since CRA's scope of work is so broad, it gives the agency a lot of leeway in determining its
tasks. On its website, the CRA states its main task as lending "a hand to investors willing to
take risks for a more vibrant city, to neighborhood residents with renewed aspirations for their
communities, and to those in need who strive to take part in the city's growing prosperity."151
This is not one task but three, and they overlap with the central tasks of other area agencies,
namely the Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation and the Los Angeles
Community Development Department. Numerous agencies devoting themselves to similar tasks
is not a detriment. Redundancy sometimes leads "to more flexible responses and generate[s]
alternatives." 152 The problem arises when government agencies fail to distinguish between
productive and wasteful redundancies.
In looking at other central tasks of the CRA, there seem to be even more overlaps with agencies
like the Los Angeles Housing Department and the Department of City Planning's Office of
Historic Resources and its Urban Design Studio. This is not to say that redevelopment work does
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not or should not encompass a wide variety of tasks or types of work. Organizations often
struggle with taking on too many tasks or focusing on an overly narrow range of tasks. In this
spectrum, it appears that the CRA is spreading itself too thin.
Defining Appropriate Project Goals and Successful Outcomes
The breadth of the agency's mission and central tasks carry over into the way goals are defined
for projects. In fact, many of the agency goals stated in its mission statement appear as project
goals for the Crenshaw project. The Crenshaw goals have varied over the agency's nearly thirty
years of involvement. They decrease in number but increase in complexity from the original
1984 redevelopment plan, a 1991 report, the 1994 project expansion plan, to the five-year
implementation plan from 2007.
The definition of goals heavily influences the definition of success. If the major goal of
redevelopment in 1991 was to build a "modern regional shopping center," it is evident that this
goal was met. However this was not one of the original goals of redevelopment nor was it
stated as a goal in CRA plans for the project area. The first and most persistent project goal
was the elimination of blight, which was listed first in three of the four sets of goals. The
subsequent chart traces the persistence of project goals from 1984 to 2007 (see Table 4.2).
Goals were weighted according to the number of times they appeared in the four plans and the
rank order they were given amongst goals.'53 Their order in this chart is determined by their
resulting weighted rank. For example, although local job creation appeared in all four plans, it
was almost always amongst the last-listed, whereas the architectural and urban design goal only
appears in the last two plans but was given higher importance.
The most prominent and persistent goal, elimination of blight, was moved down from first- to
last-listed in the 1991 set of goals as the goal about restoring economic vitality moved up to
second place. Blight removal once again becomes a priority in the 1994 expansion plan. This is
consistent with Ridley-Thomas' primary concern with the deteriorating conditions around the
mall. Another goal with a consistently high level of importance was encouraging investment
1'3 Some of the differences in the definition of goals and their level of importance can be explained by the fact that the
goals from 1984, 1994, and 2007 were from formal CRA plans for the project area, most likely intended for internal and
City staff consumption. The goals outlined in 1991 were taken from a glossy report that was distributed to the public.
The only obvious oversight in this report was not including a goal about public participation in the set of goals that were
widely disseminated to the public.
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from the private sector. While in 1984 it was the second-listed goal, it dropped to the fifth-
listed in 1991, but rebounded in the following set of plans. In 1994 and 2007, the goal was also
greatly expanded to include specific mention of the direction this investment should take.
Three other goals were also present in all four iterations of the project goals: enhancing
shopping opportunities; promoting the physical, social, and economic well being of the area and
city; and developing local job opportunities. The first was consistently given a relatively high
importance in all four sets of goals while the other two were relegated to much lower
importance with one exception. The promotion of well being is listed much higher in 1991 than
in other years, hence its higher listing in the preceding chart. This extremely vague goal was
somewhat clarified when it was merged with that of job creation in the last two plans.
154 Author. For full text of project goals, please see appendix.
In addition to the persistence of goals, it is also important to point out the significant additions
made to the 1994 plan (see Table 4.2). Two entirely new goals were added. One of those calls
for greater levels of community involvement, elements of which were added to other goals as
well. It is surprising that a public participation goal came ten years into the project, especially
considering the pressure from Watson and Russell to include the community at the outset. The
First Amendment to the
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customer service, & high quality
merchandise
Reflect high level of concern for
architectural, landscape and
urban design principles
Table 4.3 Significant Goal Additions in 1994 plan1 55
focus on community is also apparent in the preference for local contractors and the
development of business owners and tenants under the private sector investment goal. An
emphasis on customer service and quality merchandise was added to the goal about improving
shopping opportunities. This inclusion demonstrates a desire to address a common community
concern, even though supervising the level of customer service and quality of merchandise in
area stores seems outside of the agency's scope of work.
A move away from the importance of community is the subjugation of the initially stand-alone
goal of local job development into the "physical, social and economic well-being" goal. The focus
on community was apparently short-lived as the community involvement goal was removed in
the 2007 goals. This could be reflective of the CRA's view of the CCAC as ineffective and ruled
by members that are not representative of the community.'5 6 This opinion is somewhat shared
55ss Author.
s56 Chun, 2009.
by the Council office. According to the Council member's economic development deputy, the
CCAC is "pretty dysfunctional [and] very demanding [while] not understanding of the
process." 157 The condition of the CCAC is demonstrated by its dwindling attendance; while a few
years ago meetings would draw 100 people, there are now about only thirty to forty people in
regular attendance.'58 The agency continues to engage community members through formal
mechanisms but does not seem to be giving their input substantial weight, an example of
community participation as an end and not a mean.
The other newly added goal in 1 994 called for "attention to architectural, landscape and urban
design principles." The new importance of design principles perhaps became an issue because
the CRA would be overseeing the redevelopment of hundreds of parcels versus a singular
project. The CRA wanted to ensure that the corridor would present a "strong theme," although
the existence of this theme is largely absent when driving down Crenshaw except for the logos
that pop up every now and then on light posts (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2 Crenshaw logo 59
As the goals of the project morphed over the years, so did the perception of successful
outcomes. The area has undergone substantial positive change since CRA's initial involvement in
the 1980s. Some of this success is attributable to the agency's efforts and some is not. In
regards to eliminating blight in the area, the razing of the former businesses and the creation of
a new mall in its place was successful in this goal. In terms of stopping the spread of blight, the
agency was less successful in large part due to outside factors, namely the civil disturbances of
1992. If no blight remained, the CRA would no longer need to continue its work in the area.
157 Dennis Rodriguez, Interview with the author, February 26, 2009.
158 Ibid.
159 Author.
In its financial goals, the redevelopment of the mall has also had moderate amounts of success.
In determining financial success, we must keep in mind that the agency operates to fulfill goals
much larger than the financial. If the true cost of the CRA's redevelopment of the site were
calculated, it would most likely give us a very different perspective on its level of success. Tax
revenues due to the redevelopment have never reached levels that could be considered
successful. Economically vital is most likely a term that would not be used to describe the mall
or the surrounding area, but it is gaining potential. The mall has made huge strides in terms of
vacancy and sales rates but it still lags behind other area malls. It has been a testing ground for
inner-city investment and even though it has achieved limited success, it has proven to
investors that the inner-city can be viable for retail development.
The stretch of Crenshaw Boulevard from south of the 10 Freeway to the mall is dramatically
different now than it was ten years ago. Most notable are the construction of the West Angeles
Cathedral on the corner of Crenshaw and Exposition Boulevard and a new retail center a block
south at Rodeo Road, developments just north of the project area. While the level of private
investment has increased significantly in the area since the project area's creation, the CRA has
not been directly responsible for encouraging major investment. Bradley and Ridley-Thomas are
responsible for bringing in investors and retailers that have made real differences in the mall's
development. Political players are perhaps also responsible for the new development along
Crenshaw.
Community-based goals of enhancing shopping opportunities, creating local jobs, and high levels
of public participation have had fluctuating success. Compared to what was on the site before
redevelopment, there is now a wider range of retailers and services available to local area
residents. However, the types of jobs created through redevelopment have mainly been those in
the retail service sector. Current redevelopment plans will add office space to the site,
diversifying job opportunities. CRA did not advocate for this addition; it was brought about by
the developer and current mixed-use trends in development. An instance of positive political
involvement lies in the area of public participation. Community efforts for change have been the
most effective when harnessed and organized by politicians like Watson and Galanter.
The success of the mall in terms of architectural and urban design is also up for debate. One of
the mall's enduring strengths has been the preservation of the Art Deco buildings that housed
the two original department stores (see Figures 4.3 - 4.6). Their exteriors remain largely intact.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 Macy's exterior 60
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 Wal-mart exterior
The 1984 redevelopment made less successful attempts at reinterpretation (see Figures 4.7
and 4.8). A new grand entrance at Sears modified the classic chevron motif and placed it
against a backdrop of reflecting glass with less than spectacular results that look extremely
dated. This is not surprising since reinterpretations of classic styles often fall short of the
original.
160 Figures 4.3 - 4.1 2 taken by author.
Figure 4.7 Albertson's and Sav-on exterior Figure
One of the main sources of criticism in regards to how the mall interacts with its surroundings
has been the black wrought iron fence that wraps around the entire site (see Figure 4.9 and
4.10). The fence appeared during Haagen's redevelopment amidst security concerns. During the
1992 riots, Haagen credited it as being one of the main reasons the mall suffered so little
damage. Although crime has occasionally been a problem at the mall, most residents and
patrons agree that the fence is unnecessary and detracts heavily from the mall's appeal. The
most egregious are the mall's pedestrian points of entry (see Figure 4.1 1), which seem to
function as warnings for potential trespassers instead of an invitation to potential customers.
Fortunately, Capri's plans for redevelopment do not include menacing fencing.
Figure 4.9 Fencing around site Figure 4.10 Pedestrian point of entry
Another point of concern is the pervasive closing of entrances. While the Crenshaw Center was
originally designed to have active streetscapes, these were removed during redevelopment. The
ones that remain at the Macy's and Walmart buildings have all been shuttered and physically
4.8 Sears entrance
Figure 4.11 Closed Macy's street entrance Figure 4.12 Closed Sears parking lot entrance
closed off to the public. Street entrances are buffered from the sidewalk by fencing,
landscaping, and empty parking lots (see Figure 4.1 1). Entrances from main parking areas have
also been boarded up (see Figure 4.12). The entrances shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 are also
currently closed. Albertson's uses smaller side entrances and three of four of Sears' exterior
entrances are closed. The management company and anchor stores seem to be placing a higher
priority on controlling access to the mall for security reasons over activating the mall's
streetscapes, entrances, and parking areas.
Also up for debate is the agency's ability to maintain projects with good urban design. The
CRA's involvement in redevelopment projects is substantial at the outset when plans and
financing structures are being determined. The agency has the power to reject plans from
developers if they are not appropriate. After plans are approved, there are few mechanisms that
keep the agency involved in more than regulatory or facilitator roles. In this case, the agency
was involved in the design of the mall in 1984 but has had little control over how private
owners and management companies choose to operate the site. The CRA can request that
facilities be maintained and upgraded regularly but it does not have the power of enforcement.
Although most would agree that the major entrances of the mall should kept open or that the
mall should retain active streetscapes, the agency has little power to force these practices.
Financial Management in an Environment of Constraints
As stated earlier, financial management plays a lesser role in this analysis, but is the area being
the most proactively reshaped by the agency. For example, most project areas run along
arterials and extend one parcel depth (see Figure 4.13), severely limiting funding since the CRA
collects tax increments only from within these boundaries. The agency is investigating 
merging
the areas in the region. This could increase bond and leveraging capacity, 
and pool resources to








Figure 4.13 South Los Angeles Project Areas1 61
fund more projects, but will come up against opposition from area community action
committees. These groups will undergo a corresponding restructuring around 
a single project
area, losing power over individual areas, and the power of eminent domain 
will be reinstated for
ten years.
South Los Angeles project areas are also constrained due to their inability to attract the same
level of private investment as other areas of the city. This has lead to politically 
imposed
development partners and past reluctance to turn down wiling-yet inappropriate-developers.
Increased private sector interest, starting with the 2005 bidding war, has repositioned 
the CRA.
The agency rejected Capri's financing structure for its proposed redevelopment for relying too
heavily on public subsidy. This could mark the beginning of a new era of inner-city 
investment,
one in which public agencies have more control over the terms of private sector 
partnerships.
161 CRA/LA, "South Los Angeles Redevelopment," Spring 2009.
The CRA has had varying levels of success in the redevelopment of the Crenshaw Center into
the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza. The success of its massive effort at internal reform is
tempered by the fact that few leaders of CRA projects come from within the agency and are
more often found in the world of politics. The CRA also maintains relationships with challenging
and frustrating power dynamics. Its charge as an agency that seeks the maximization of public
value creates a mission that is too broad, in turn causing confusion in defining the agency's
central tasks. Its projects' goals suffer from extreme breadth as well, leading to goals that are
sometimes outside the control of the agency. The CRA has incredible potential to reshape the
city but has become mired in a series of constraints. The next chapter will propose strategies to




CRA's organizational capacity has a definite impact on its urban redevelopment project
outcomes. In the case of the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza redevelopment, the organization of
human and social resources was intricately linked and especially important. What has emerged
from the fieldwork and empirical research is a strategic understanding of organizational capacity
that is useful in diagnosing key features of an organization that pursues urban redevelopment,
and in suggesting areas for strengthening the organization's capacity. The key features of
organizational capacity for CRA that have become apparent are cultivating internal leadership,
concretely defining mission and central tasks, negotiating power-balanced relationships, and
managing their network of actors.
Principal Findings
While the official CRA organization chart shows a board at the head its hierarchy, this is not
reflective of the network of actors that have crucial roles in determining the agency's work. The
most influential set of actors come from the political realm. The Mayor and City Council must
appoint CRA board members. The City Council must also approve all agency actions and has the
power to determine project areas. Some Council members even appoint representatives to the
community action committees. These are the formal and publicly known channels of political
power: however, the political influence exerted on the CRA extends beyond this. Politicians
often determine the CRA's partners in development as Bradley did with Haagen and Ridley-
Thomas did with Hammond. CRA board members also recently report pressure from Council
members to approve or reject certain projects. 162 When most of the agency's direction comes
from outside actors, it is not surprising that few leaders come from within the agency, an
environment not conducive to the cultivation of leaders.
This lack of internal leadership creates an agency lacking a concise and coherent vision. This
manifests in an overly broad mission statement that tries to encompass work normally done by
a variety of agencies. The mission statement also fails to provide a sense of the agency's
underlying values that guide its work and does not provide guidance on standards of success.
CRA's all-inclusive mission statement filters down into vague definitions of its central tasks and
project goals. Its areas of work range from affordable housing, job creation and retention,
economic development, transportation, public art, open space, historic preservation, childcare,
culture, and so on. The paradox in CRA's work is that an overly comprehensive mission and wide
array of tasks is forcing staff to create mental shortcuts. Mission and tasks are made into a
single sound bite: eliminate blight. While aware of the larger goals of the agency, this sound bite
becomes pervasive in determining the day-to-day activities of staff and in skewing the
perception of project success. The agency's diffuse definition of its mission, central tasks, and
projects goals most likely result from its role as a public agency responsible to many in the
creation of public value. In undertaking large and complex redevelopment projects, it is
expected to meet the needs of various constituencies, often with different and sometimes
opposing interests.
The CRA maintains relationships with skewed power dynamics in many settings, especially with
elected officials. The agency's informal rulers are the Mayor and City Council. CRA staff operates
with the short-term goals of Council members in mind more so than that of the agency. Another
group of actors that the CRA has traditionally depended upon is developers. Often backed by
politicians, developers set the terms of partnerships that sometimes leave CRA involved in
projects with great public expenditure and little public benefit. The power dynamics of CRA's
relationships with community members and organizations are opposite of their other
relationships. While at one point community groups might have had significant input in the
162 David Zahniser and Jessica Garrison, "City funding for developer angers housing advocates." Los Angeles Times,
September 15, 2007.
redevelopment of their neighborhoods, the agency now views these groups as unrepresentative
of the range of opinions present in the community and engages them only superficially.
Projects are not carried out by the hierarchy shown in CRA's organizational chart (see Figure
4.1), but by a network of actors from various sectors. It took the Mayor, a Council member, a
state senator, community organizations, a reluctant developer, a handful of other public
agencies, and the CRA to make the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza a reality. The agency's
interactions with these different groups of actors are determined by the nature of the project
bringing them together (for example, commercial versus mixed-use development) and the
balance of power in their relationship, as discussed in the previous paragraph. The challenge
seems to be keeping all of these sets of actors engaged and satisfied in a redevelopment
process that redistributes power through negotiation and shares planning and decision-making
responsibilities.' 63 Throughout this process, the agency must also push an agenda of using the
redevelopment mechanism to create public value. While it is difficult to aggregate "the widely
differing views of the public into a single and coherent judgment of value,"1 64 public servants
must strive to produce the most significant benefit for a large portion of the population, or a
segment of the population in need, in line with their agency's core values.
It is important to note that political involvement is necessary in the area of attracting private
sector investment. Development partners and retail tenants for the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza
had to be lured to the mall and coaxed to stay. Current Council member Bernard Parks has
continued this tradition: he has reached out to mall tenants on numerous occasions when
rumors of lease termination arise. 16 Whereas political involvement in other areas of CRA's work
seems overwhelming, it is imperative in this capacity. A personal plea from the project manager
of the Crenshaw project area does not carry the same weight as one from the Council member,
nor the same political influence.
Recommendations
Vision, Mission, and Central Tasks - The agency needs to narrow its scope of work and expand its




diffuse, the less successful."' 66 The agency suffers from taking on too many roles while
concentrating these efforts in small areas of the city. The current power and organizational
structure of the agency contributes to this. Politicians want efforts targeted to their areas, a
belief consistent with Ovrom's clusters that focus attention on regions.
At the core of the tension between roles it should and that it actually plays, the CRA struggles
with acknowledging its redevelopment and planning roles. While its name and origin would
suggest that it functions solely as a redevelopment agency, its history, current projects, and
powers suggest that it also performs many planning functions. The CRA has the potential to be
an agency that does much more than solely clear sites for redevelopment and find developers.
In increasing the size of its project areas, and now perhaps creating project areas of
unprecedented size, it will inherently have urban planning functions and the power to reshape
entire neighborhoods and areas of the city. Redevelopment and planning are interdependent:
the connections between the two must be strengthened. The agency's mission must be refined
with this in mind. This will in turn create more clearly defined central tasks and measures of
success. With a better sense of the agency's true goals and tasks, staff will no longer need to
distill mission statements into two word phrases. This will also result in more appropriate project
goals that concentrate efforts on achieving success versus carrying out tasks.
Leadership and Relationships - Meaningful change at the agency would require a renegotiated
relationship with the political realm. This will prove a greater challenge, as politicians view their
oversight of the CRA as crucial to determining the future of their domains. The Mayor and City
Council should retain an active role in determining the city's redevelopment direction, but the
agency needs more room to chart a direction independent of political interests. Given the power
to create project areas, the CRA can choose to look at redevelopment on a larger, city-wide
scale. For example, the construction of the Expo light rail line, which will run from downtown Los
Angeles to the ocean, will provide a corridor of redevelopment opportunities. The CRA should
strategically look at how redevelopment projects can densify the areas near the rail line and
facilitate the creation of transit-oriented development spanning across various CRA regions.
Redevelopment projects tied to short-term political interests cannot achieve long-term success
for the city. In furthering a reevaluation of the agency's ties to the political sector, the Mayor,
1'6 John Kaliski, Interview with the author, February 24, 2009.
City Council, CRA board, and the agency itself should also review the current system of
appointed board members and chief executive officer. They should determine whether these
appointments are allowing for the implementation of a comprehensive redevelopment vision for
the city.
In gaining greater independence from the political sector, the agency will gain the autonomy to
create its own mandate and cultivate genuine internal leaders. These leaders need to be
politically savvy and technically skilled, as well as able to work in uncertain, constantly changing
environments. They must also instill a flexibility to manage the numerous relationships in their
networks and encourage true cooperation within them. Recognizing the importance of and
strengthening these relationships should be one of the main foci of agency leaders. Increasing
independence from the political sector must be paired with creating symbiotic relationships with
political actors. The CRA cannot operate without the support of politicians, namely in attracting
investment into underserved areas of the city, and Council members cannot redevelop a vacant
lot in their district independently. Council members will undoubtedly have many high priority
redevelopment projects during their time in office, which will need help from the CRA to come
to fruition. A productive relationship between the CRA and the City Council begins with an
understanding of their interdependence: neither can be successful without the other.
There is also room for creating greater connections between the CRA and other public agencies,
like those with economic and housing development functions, and most importantly the Planning
Department. A government agency coalition with similar priorities and visions for development
could go a long way in influencing the issues at the political forefront. This coalition could begin
with increased attention to a particular area of the city, or with a particular project that involves
many city agencies. A more comprehensive coalition can be built around these initial
connections. In order to make these coalitions a success, CRA leaders must identify a group of
staff members committed to strengthening partnerships to lead this charge.
The CRA also needs to take active steps in rebuilding its relationship with community members.
The fact that some residents in the Crenshaw area believe that eminent domain is still an option
implies that the agency has not done a good job of communicating with and engaging the public
thus far. A better understanding of how the agency functions and its goals for the area would
serve to alleviate the fear and tension between the two groups of actors and increase the
agency's perceived legitimacy amongst the community. If the CRA were to be successful in
merging the South Los Angeles project areas, this would provide the agency and community
members an opportunity to restructure their relationship into one of mutual acknowledgement
and respect. The agency currently seems far from understanding the potential political
importance of this. By having politicians play the role of the intermediary between the agency
and community members, the CRA is ceding a potential source of support to the political sector.
Herein lies another opportunity for coalition building: the CRA has ability to create coalitions
around issues of mutual importance through meaningful forms of community engagement where
planning and decision-making powers are shared. The recent economic downturn has caused a
renewed focus on the creation and retention of local jobs, which could provide an excellent
starting point.
Potential Moving Forward
Public agencies have central roles in determining urban planning outcomes. They must be
reflective and evaluative of their work in order to be successful and effective. Protzen's concept
of idoneity captures how an organization can accomplish this:
[By] understanding the environment in which it works; recognizing and clarifying
the objectives and intentions of those it serves and of its institutional colleagues;
and defining ways of adapting and reconciling its environment and objectives
with proposed development goals. 167
The underlying premise of this investigation is that better-designed and functioning cities
emerge from better-designed and functioning organizations. Too often public agencies follow
mandates with procedures established decades ago. They do not question or evaluate whether
these practices remain relevant or appropriate. The CRA has demonstrated its ability and will to
undergo massive change. However, these changes have fallen short of recreating it into an
idoneous organization. Nevertheless, with continuous evaluation and reflection on policies and
practices, the agency can move closer towards this goal.
The site of the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza has morphed into a completely new shopping
experience than how it was first envisioned; yet it retains an iconic stature in the neighborhood.
There have been numerous actors and forces that have created what stands there today. A
167 Inam, 185.
whole new set of actors will soon morph the mall into a new experience altogether, but its iconic
buildings will remain. The CRA has the potential to reshape itself in a similar way. Continually
working to understand its environment and colleagues, clarifying its objectives, and finding ways
to adapt to changing circumstances will result in meaningful change. Departments, leaders,
mission statements, and project goals will come and go. At the center of its work should remain
a strategic, citywide redevelopment vision that works to maximize pubic value.
Appendix 1 - Interview Questions
Base questions:
* What are the measures of success for large-scale urban redevelopment projects?
* Have the redevelopments of the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza have been successful so far?
What aspects of the project have been successful and which haven't?
* What have been the major challenges the project has faced while in operation?
* Who have been the key actors in the development of the mall? How have they
contributed?
* What do you envision for the site 50 years from now?
* What role do you think your organization will play in the project at this time?
* Are there any documents or individuals I should contact in continuing my research?
CRA staff questions:
* Why did the CRA decide to become involved in redeveloping the shopping center in the
1980s?
* What were the defined goals of the project at the outset? How have they changed over
time?
* How are project goals determined?
* Do you think the mall has met these goals? How?
* How is the CRA measuring the success of this project?
* How many other agencies (both public and private) were involved in the project's
development? Which of these relationships have worked the best?
* How have community members been included in developing plans for the site?
* What is the current redevelopment plan for the mall?
* How do you think these changes will improve the project?
* How do you think this project fits into the long-term development goals of the CRA?
Political staffer questions:
* How often does your office have contact with the CRA?
* How would you describe your relationship with the agency?
* How have community members been included in developing plans for the site?
* What is the current redevelopment plan for the mall?
* How do you think these changes will improve the project?
* How long has your office been involved in the development of the mall?
* What organizations have you been involved with in relation to mall? Which of these
relationships have worked the best?
* How do you think this project fits into the long-term development goals of the area?
Redevelopment Plan for Crenshaw First Amendment to the Redevelopment Plan for the Crenshaw and Amended Crenshaw
the Crenshaw Redevelopment Project: Crenshaw Redevelopment Project (1994) Redevelopment Projects (2007)
Redevelopment Project Biennial Report, 1989 -
(1984) 1991 (1991)
1. To eliminate and prevent
the spread of blight and
deterioration and to
conserve, rehabilitate and
redevelop the Project Area
in accord with the General
Plan, the Redevelopment
Plan.
2. To encourage the
investment of the private
sector in the development
and redevelopment of the




3. To stabilize and restore
the economic vitality of this
regional center of the City
of Los Angeles.
4. To stabilize and restore
tax revenues to the City of
Los Angeles
5. To enhance shopping
opportunities for the area
residents.
6. To promote the physical,
social and economic well
being of the Project Area,
the City of Los Angeles,
and its citizens.
7. To promote the
development of local job
opportunities.
Major goal: The development




*To stabilize and restore the
economic vitality of this area
* To enhance shopping
opportunities for the area
residents
* To promote the physical,
social and economic well-
being of the project area
-To promote the
development of local job
opportunities
* To encourage the
investment of the pnvate
sector in the development
and redevelopment of the
project area by eliminating
impediments
* To stabilize and restore tax
revenues to the City of Los
Angeles
* Elimination and prevention
of the spread of blight and
deterioration
1. To eliminate and prevent the spread of blight and deterioration
and to conserve, rehabilitate and redevelop the Expansion
Project Area in accord with the City's General Plan, specific
plans, the Amended Redevelopment Plan and local codes and
ordinances.
2. To involve as many property owners, tenants, residents and
community groups as possible and to coordinate the revitalization
efforts that meet the diverse needs of the Expansion Project
Area.
3. To encourage the investment of the private sector in the
development and redevelopment of the Expansion Project Area
by eliminating impediments to such development.
a. Provide additional commercial, office and retail development
that complements, not competes, with the Baldwin Hills
Crenshaw Plaza Mall.
b. Every effort shall be made to promote the growth and
development of business owners and tenants and to retain
existing tenants.
c. To the greatest extent possible, Crenshaw community-based
development and construction contractor firms should be
employed in the Expansion Project Area.
4. To enhance shopping opportunities for the area residents.
Build local consumer loyalty, reverse persistent "dollar flight"
trend by emphasizing strong marketing and customer service and
by providing high quality merchandise and service.
5. To achieve an environment that reflects a high level of concern
for architectural, landscape and urban design pnnciples that meet
the objectives of the Amended Redevelopment Plan.
a. Develop a strong theme to unite and promote the Expansion
Project Area with the rest of the community's cultural and artistic
strengths.
b. Improve public parking, other facilities, services, utility lines,
lighting, public safety, pedestrian ways and public transportation.
c. Eliminate blight through abatement or code compliance,
reconstruction and assembly of parcels into more developable
sites for desirable uses.
6. To promote the physical, social and economic well-being of the
Expansion Project Area, the City of Los Angeles and its citizens.
a. Preserve the Expansion Project Area's existing employment
base.
b. Encourage job training and the development of local job
opportunities to the greatest extent feasible under law.
. To eliminate and prevent the spread of blight and
deterioration and to conserve, rehabilitate and
redevelop the Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza
(formerly the Crenshaw Shopping Center), as well
as the Amended Project Area in accord with the
City's General Plan, specific plans, the Amended
Redevelopment Plan and local codes and
ordinances.
* To encourage the investment of the private sector
in the development and redevelopment of the
Amended Project Area by eliminating impediments
to such development
a. Provide additional commercial, office and retail
development in the Santa Barbara Plaza center that
complements, not competes with, the Baldwin Hills
Crenshaw Plaza Mall.
b. Every effort shall be made to promote the growth
and development of business owners and tenants
and to retain existing tenants.
c. To the greatest extent possible, Crenshaw
community-based development and construction
contractor firms should be employed in the
Amended Project Area.
* To enhance shopping opportunities for the area
residents. Build local consumer loyalty, reverse the
persistent "dollar flight" trend by emphasizing strong
marketing and customer service and by providing
high quality merchandise and service.
. To achieve an environment that reflects a high
level of concern for architectural, landscape and
urban design principles that meet the objectives of
the Crenshaw and Amended Crenshaw
Redevelopment Plans.
- To promote the physical, social and economic well
being of the Amended Project Area, the City of Los
Angeles and its residents.
a. Preserve the Amended Project Area's existing
employment base.
b. Encourage job training and the development of
local job opportunities.
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